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Common Law Disclosure Duties and the Sin of Omission:
Testing the Meta-theories
Kimberly D. Krawiec∗ & Kathryn Zeiler∗∗

One of the most hotly debated questions under the common law is under what
circumstances an individual has a duty to disclose relevant information unknown to the
person with whom she bargains. Dozens of law review articles and treatises and over
1000 cases explore this vexing question of when and what a contracting party must
disclose to her counterparty, even in the absence of explicit misleading statements.
Although one frequently encounters statements that, absent a fiduciary or confidential
relationship, an individual need never disclose all that she knows to her bargaining
partner, this is best construed as mere rhetoric by courts, rather than an accurate statement
of law.1 Even a cursory examination of the cases reveals, instead, that courts require full
disclosure in some circumstances, but not in others.
Determining what circumstances will lead courts to intervene to correct disparities in
knowledge between bargaining parties, however, has proved problematic. Courts
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1
See, e.g., Arthur Linton Corbin, 3 Corbin on Contracts §597 (1960) (explaining that, “[s]tatements are
exceedingly common, both in texts and in court opinions, that relief will not be given on the ground of
mistake unless the mistake is ‘mutual.’ Such a broad generalization is untrue.” ); Anthony T. Kronman,
Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. Leg. Studies 1, 6 (1978) (stating that, “[i]n
the past, it was often asserted that, absent fraud or misrepresentation, a unilateral mistake never justifies
excusing the mistaken party from his duty to perform or pay damages. This is certainly no longer the law,
and Corbin has demonstrated that in all probability it never was.”); French v. Vining, 102 Mass. 132, *3
(1869) (stating that “[i]t is sometimes rather loosely said that mere silence, on the part of the vendor, as to a
known defect, does not amount to a fraud. But this is far from being universally true.”); Heritage Ins. Co.
of America v. First Nat. Bank of Cicero; 629 F.Supp. 1412, 1415 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (stating that “no duty of
disclosure exists absent a fiduciary duty or public trust between parties to a transaction”).
1

repeatedly reach divergent results in similar, or even seemingly identical, cases, and have
failed to articulate a coherent or generally accepted rule as to when a duty of candor will
be imposed on parties to an arm’s-length transaction.
As a result, numerous legal commentators have analyzed the law of fraudulent silence
(also referred to as actionable nondisclosure or actionable silence) in an attempt to
identify some guiding principle that will rationalize the cases and lend some
predictability to the question of under what circumstances a person legally is permitted to
exploit her superior knowledge to the detriment of those with whom she transacts.
Although some commentators point to various specific factors (such as, for example,
whether the withheld information related to a latent defect or whether the litigating
parties were in a confidential or fiduciary relationship) that courts look to either alone or
in some combination in deciding cases, others conclude that no useful rule of law can be
found in the cases.2 Still other legal scholars, most notably Anthony Kronman and Kim
Lane Scheppele, reject the notion that narrow doctrinal rules motivate fraudulent silence
decisions and instead advance meta-theories (based, respectively, on whether courts seek
primarily to further economic efficiency or fairness) in an attempt to untangle the cases
and illuminate the law of fraudulent silence.3

2

Deborah A. DeMott, Do You Have the Right to Remain Silent?: Duties of Disclosure in Business
Transactions, 19 Del J. Corp. L. 65, 66 (1994) (stating that “[m]y thesis is that legal doctrine does not
resolve these scenarios in a symmetrical fashion”); George Spencer Bower, The Law Relating to
Actionable Nondisclosure and Other Breaches of Duty in Relations of Confidence and Influence, v-vi
(1915) (arguing that the law of actionable nondisclosure cannot be “fit . . . into the rigid framework of a
code.” ) (quoted in Kim LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON
LAW 112 (1988) ); Paula J. Dalley, The Law of Deceit, 1790-1860: Continuity Amidst Change, 39 Am. J.
Legal Hist. 405, 407 (1995) (discussing the law of fraud, including the law of fraudulent silence, and noting
that, “there does not seem to be any factor which accurately predicts which policy a particular court will
find determinative in a particular case, other than the merits of the case”).
3
See, e.g., Scheppele, supra note 2 at 119-124 (advocating an equality of access approach to explain the
law of actionable nondisclosure); Kim Lane Scheppele, It’s Just Not Right: The Ethics of Insider Trading,
56 Law & Contemp. Probs. 125 (1993) (same); Kronman, supra note 1 at 13-15 (arguing that the law of
actionable nondisclosure is best explained by the law’s desire to reward those who have expended time and
effort to acquire the undisclosed information); Alan Strudler, Moral Complexity in the Law of
Nondisclosure, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 337 (1997) (arguing that the law of actionable nondisclosure as applied
to buyers is best explained through a deontological philosophy); Aland Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral
2

It is these meta-theories – along with the famous Supreme Court Case of Laidlaw v.
Organ4 – that inspired this project. In Laidlaw, Organ had been bargaining over the price
of 111 hogsheads of tobacco with Laidlaw’s agent, Francis Girault, on the evening of
February 18, 1815, but did not reach an agreement on price before departing. During the
night, three gentlemen who had been with the British fleet came ashore with news that
the Treaty of Ghent had been signed, ending the war of 1812 and lifting the blockade of
the port of New Orleans. One of these men was the brother of Organ’s business partner
(who had a one-third interest in the profits of the tobacco) and informed Organ of the
news during the night.
Although the news of the war’s end was to be published in a handbill at eight a.m.
the next morning, shortly after sunrise on the morning of the 19th, Organ returned to
Girault and purchased the tobacco without disclosing the news.5 A few hours later, the
news was released and the price of tobacco rose by thirty to fifty percent.
In a short – but famous -- opinion, Justice Marshall ruled that Organ had no duty to
disclose his knowledge of the end of the war to Girault.6 Due to the cryptic nature of
Marshall’s opinion, however, commentators have struggled to identify the principle
underlying the decision. In the process, several theories have emerged that purport to
explain not only the Court’s decision in Laidlaw, but the large and seemingly inconsistent
body of other fraudulent silence cases as well.
Unfortunately, many of these authors discuss a limited number of cases that they
believe support their asserted theory, without providing evidence that the chosen cases
Principal in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 375 (1999) (justifying insider trading regulation
on a deontological theory of “equitable disclosure”).
4
15 U.S. 178 (1817).
5
15 U.S. at 182-83. Apparently, Girault asked Organ “whether there was any news which was calculated
to enhance the price or value of the article about to be purchased.” Id. at 183. The lower court determined
that there was no evidence that Organ’s reply “suggested anything to the said Girault, calculated to impose
upon him with respect to said news,” and directed the jury to find for Organ. Id. at 183-84.
6
15 U.S. at 194. Marshall did, however, remand to the lower court for a jury determination regarding
Organ’s response to Girault’s inquiry. Id.
3

are representative, and without distinguishing cases that do not support their theory.7
This Article represents the first attempt to study empirically the factors that cause courts
to impose disclosure duties on bargaining parties in some circumstances, but not in
others.8
We use data coded from 466 decisions spanning over a wide array of jurisdictions and
covering over 200 years. The results are mixed. In some cases our data support the
conventional wisdom relating to common law disclosure duties. For example, our data
support the claim that courts are more likely to require the disclosure of latent, as
opposed to patent, defects. In addition, courts are more likely to require full disclosure
between parties in a fiduciary or confidential relationship.
On the other hand, our results cast doubt on much of the conventional wisdom
regarding the law of fraudulent silence. Indeed, our results challenge ten of the most
prominent theories that have been asserted to explain when courts will require disclosure.
We find that courts are no more likely to impose disclosure duties when the information
is casually acquired as opposed to deliberately acquired, and that unequal access to
information by the contracting parties is not a significant factor that drives courts to find
a duty to disclose. We do find, however, that when these two factors are present
simultaneously courts are significantly more likely to force disclosure. Perhaps most
interestingly, although it is generally understood that courts have become more likely to
impose disclosure duties over time, we find that courts actually have become less likely
over time to find that the informed party owed the uninformed party a duty to disclose.

7

See generally, Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (2002) (criticizing
the methodology of much legal empirical research).

4

I.

MOTIVATION BEHIND OUR SYSTEMATIC APPROACH

As previously discussed, court rulings seem to conflict in a large number of
fraudulent silence cases, causing commentators to struggle for an underlying principle to
explain the disparate outcomes of seemingly identical cases. Some of the variation in the
cases may arise from the fact that several distinct bodies of common law often bear on
the same transaction, including contract, tort, equity, and restitution.9 Even accounting for
this, however, courts seem to decide fraudulent silence cases in an unusually inconsistent
and fact-specific manner.
Story’s observations notwithstanding, the question of when and what a contracting
party must disclose to her partner has confounded legal theorists since ancient times. For
example, in De Officiis, Cicero attempts to tackle the problem by constructing a series of
hypotheticals in which one party to a transaction has information that the other does
not.10 He then creates an imaginary dialogue in which the Stoic philosophers Anipater
and Diogenes debate whether morality mandates disclosure by the knowledgeable
party.11

8

One prior attempt to systematically study the cases is Dalley, supra note 2. Although Professor Dalley’s
study is not a statistical analysis of the cases, her article is an important contribution to the literature and
her findings are discussed throughout this Article.
9
DeMott, supra note 2 at 66. In particular, the intersection of tort and contract law in these cases raises
some interesting questions. Typically, plaintiffs successfully alleging that they were induced to enter a
transaction through their counterparty’s fraudulent silence on a material point might either proceed under
contract law and rescind the transaction, or sue under tort and recover damages. See, e.g., Justice v.
Anderson County, 955 S.W.2d 613 (1997) (stating that, “[a]n individual induced by fraud to enter into a
contract might elect between two remedies. He might treat the contract as voidable and sue for the
equitable remedy of rescission or he might treat the contract as existing and sue for damages at law under
the theory of deceit.”). See also, DeMott, supra note 2 at 67.
On the other hand, some courts hold that a tort claim cannot be based on the same facts serving as
the basis for a breach of contract claim. Accordingly, plaintiffs alleging actionable nondisclosures in the
formation of a contract must sue under contract law, and are prohibited from suing in tort. See, e.g.,
Heidtman Steel Products, Inc. v. Compuware Corp., 164 F.Supp.2d 931, 939 (N.D. Ohio 2001).
Today, this problem is further exacerbated by the various state and federal statutes that also govern
the required disclosures in some transactions, such as the federal securities acts, state commercial codes,
and state laws mandating disclosures in particular transactions, such as real estate and automobile sales, and
health care delivery.
10
Cicero, On Moral Obligation (De Oficiis) , ¶51 (John Higginbotham, tr., 1967).
11
Id. at ¶¶51-60. Cicero argues that morality requires a duty of full candor in all instances.
5

In the thirteenth century, the subject received the attention of such eminent figures
as Saint Thomas Aquinas, who argued for a surprisingly restrictive view of disclosure
duties.12 Writing in the mid-1700s, the French legal theorist and Roman law expert R.J.
Pothier gave extended treatment to the subject of fraudulent silence in his Treatise on the
Contract of Sale.13 Finally, disclosure duties – and the doctrine of fraudulent silence, in
particular -- seemed to enjoy special attention from both civil and common law scholars
during the nineteenth century, perhaps due to the great economic changes taking place
during that time (and the accompanying legal changes that might be expected).14
Even the numerous sections of the various restatements of the law dealing with
the issue lend little guidance. For example, Section 153 of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts states that “[w]here a mistake of one party at the time a contract was made as to
a basic assumption on which he made the contract has a material effect on the agreed
exchange of performances that is adverse to him, the contract is voidable by him if . . .
the other party had reason to know of the mistake.”15 Although the restaters provide
several illustrations in an attempt to clarify this statement, they provide little guidance as
to what constitutes a “basic assumption” or a “material effect,” leaving courts wide
latitude to apply the rule on a case-by-case basis.16
Although Section 161 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts seems to provide
the most concrete guidance as to which factors lead courts to impose a duty on bargaining
12

R.J. Pothier, Treatise on the Contract of Sale , Art. I, No. 238 (L.S. Cushing, tr., 1839) (stating that Saint
Thomas would permit “the seller to conceal the defects of the thing, except in two cases, namely; 1, when
the defect is of such a nature that it might cause some damage to the buyer; and, 2, when the seller takes
advantage of such concealment to sell the thing for more than it is worth.”) Pothier at Art. I, Nos. 237-38.
See also, Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, 179-180 (1977)
(discussing the movement away from the sound price rule).
13
Horwitz, supra note 12.
14
See, e.g., Edward H. Wilson, Concealment or Silence as a Form of Fraud, and the Relief or Redress
Afforded Therefor, Both in Law and in Equity, The Counselor 230 (1895); Horwitz, supra note 12 at 173201 (discussing the response of contract law to changing market and economic conditions); GULIAN C.
VERPLANCK, AN ESSAY ON THE DOCTRINE OF CONTRACTS (1825); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (1877); JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1828).
15
Restatement of Contracts (2d) §153.
6

parties to disclose material information, it too falls short of clearly specifying all of the
circumstances under which one party owes another a duty to disclose.. For example,
Section 161 lists some cases in which the court will impose a duty to disclose: when the
information would update or correct previous assertions, when the parties are in a
confidential or fiduciary relationship, and when the information relates to a latent
defect.17 However, the section also specifies that disclosure is required when one
contracting party knows that the other is operating under a mistake as to a “basic
assumption.” Although the illustrations provide several examples of what constitutes a
basic assumption, section 161 suffers from the same lack of clarity that characterizes the
other Restatement sections dealing with the issue of fraudulent silence, leaving courts
with wide latitude when applying the rule.
In summary, the law of fraudulent silence has confounded scholars and practitioners
for many years. Given this historical lack of guidance that persists to this day, using a
large sample of randomly selected cases we set out in the following Section to investigate
systematically whether particular factors significantly influence courts when they decide
whether informed parties have duties to disclose information to uninformed parties.
16

Id. Other Restatement treatments of the duty to disclose at common law include: Restatement of
Restitution §12; Restatement of Torts (2d) §551; and Restatement of Contracts (1st) §472(1)(b).
17
In particular, Section 161 states that a person’s nondisclosure is equivalent to an assertion (and therefore
actionable) only:
“(a) where he knows that disclosure of the fact is necessary to prevent some previous
assertion from being a misrepresentation or from being fraudulent or material.
(b) where he knows that disclosure of the fact would correct a mistake of the other party
as to a basic assumption on which that party is making the contract and if non-disclosure
of the fact amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable
standards of fair dealing.
(c) where he knows that disclosure of the fact would correct a mistake of the other party
as to the contents or effect of a writing, evidencing or embodying an agreement in whole
or in part.
(d) where the other person is entitled to know the fact because of a relation of trust and
confidence between them.
Restatement of Contracts (2d) §161. Furthermore, the Comments and Illustrations detail several other
instances when disclosure will be required, including when the undisclosed information relates to a latent
defect. Id. At Illustration 3.d (stating that, under certain circumstances, “[a] seller of real or personal
property is, for example, ordinarily expected to disclose a known latent defect. . . .”)
7

II.

COLLECTION OF HYPOTHESES AND CONSTRUCTED INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

This study examines a number of independent variables and their relationship, if any,
to courts’ decisions to impose liability for fraudulent silence. The variables, all of which
are detailed in this section, include twenty variables related to case characteristics, which
can be divided into five general classes: the type of information that was undisclosed, the
type of transaction in which the parties were engaged, how the undisclosed information
was acquired, the characteristics of the uninformed party, and the behavior of the
informed party. The case decision year and the geographic region and jurisdiction of the
court deciding the case are also included as independent variables.
A. The Type of Information
Commentators frequently assert that the imposition of disclosure duties is
dependent on the type of information in question. In particular, it has been claimed that
courts give special treatment to intrinsic information, information relating to personal
intentions or opinions, information relating to latent defects, information concerning a
defect likely to cause bodily injury or property damage, and information that would have
updated or corrected previously disclosed information.
1. The information was intrinsic, as opposed to extrinsic or market,
information
It has been argued by some commentators that courts distinguish between
intrinsic facts, which relate directly to the subject matter of the transaction, and extrinsic
facts, which relate to the market conditions or environment affecting the subject matter of
the transaction, and require the disclosure of intrinsic facts only.18 Joseph Story
explained the distinction as follows:

18

Joseph Story, 1 Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence §210 (12th ed. 1877); 2 James Kent,
Commentaries on American Law, 377 (1827) (noting that, “[t]here may be some difference in the facility
8

Intrinsic circumstances are properly those which belong to the
nature, character, condition, title, safety, use, or enjoyment, &c., of the
subject-matter of the contract; such as natural or artificial defects in the
subject-matter. Extrinsic circumstances are properly those which are
accidentally connected with it, or rather bear upon it, at the time of the
contract, and may enhance or diminish its value or price, or operate as a
motive to make or decline the contract; such as facts respecting the
occurrence of peace or war, the rise or fall of markets, the character of the
neighborhood, the increase or diminution of duties, or the like
circumstances.19
To illustrate, in the previously discussed case of Laidlaw v. Organ,20 Justice
Marshall ruled that “the intelligence of extrinsic circumstances, which might influence
the price of the commodity, and which was exclusively within the knowledge of the
vendee,” need not be disclosed to the vendor. 21 In Laidlaw, the information concerning
the end of the war of 1812 and the consequent lifting of the blockade of the port of New
Orleans was extrinsic information, because it did not pertain to conditions solely
affecting the tobacco exchanged between Organ and Laidlaw, but instead pertained to
conditions affecting the market for and price of all tobacco being shipped from New
Orleans. Accordingly, it could be argued that Justice Marshall permitted nondisclosure in
that case because the undisclosed information was an extrinsic fact. If it had been an
intrinsic fact, according to this theory, disclosure would have been required.
Other commentators, however, argue that the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction
provides, at best, only a partial explanation. It thus has been argued that, although
disclosure has been required more often with respect to intrinsic, rather than extrinsic,
facts, the better explanation for such rulings is that intrinsic facts may not be readily

with which the rule [of disclosure] applies between facts and circumstances that are intrinsic, and form
material ingredients of the contract, and those that are extrinsic, and form no component part of it, though
they create inducements to enter into the contract, or affect the price of the article.”); Pothier, supra note 12
at Art. III, No. 242 (noting that, “there is no doubt, that . . . a buyer is not entitled to complain, that the
seller has not informed him of circumstances extrinsic to the thing sold, however much he may be
interested in knowing them”).
19
Story, supra note 18 at § 210.
20
15 U.S. 178 (1817). See supra notes 4 - 6 and accompanying text.
21
15 U.S. at 194 (emphasis added).
9

discoverable by the uninformed party, whereas extrinsic facts are,22 or that extrinsic facts
are normally the result of a deliberate search, whereas intrinsic facts are often casually
acquired.23 In addition, it has been argued that the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction cannot
adequately explain the results in all of the cases, particularly those where the uninformed
party is the purchaser, as opposed to the seller.24 Finally, it has been argued by some
observers that the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction has been replaced in modern
jurisprudence with other theories of disclosure duties and is no longer relevant to court
decisions concerning the degree of candor required of contracting parties.25 We thus
predicted that in earlier years courts were more likely to rule that a duty to disclose
existed in cases involving intrinsic information, but that this effect narrowed in
significance over time and finally disappeared altogether.
2. The undisclosed information concerned personal intentions or opinions
Although the distinction between opinion and fact is not always clear,
commentators seem to agree that failures to disclose personal opinions or intentions are
not actionable.26 This rule is sometimes referred to as a distinction between personal and
general information, or between individual and common facts.27 As stated by Gulian
Verplanck:

22

See W. Page Keeton, Concealment and Nondisclosure, 15 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 21 (1936); Scheppele supra
note 2 at 128-29.
23
Kronman, supra note 1 at 17-18 (arguing that market information is typically, though not always,
acquired through deliberate search.)
24
Keeton, supra note 22 at 21.
25
Scheppele, supra note 2 at 128-29.
26
See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 12 at 263 (stating that misstatements of opinion were not actionable at
common law, the rationale being to prevent judicial incursion into the private bargaining process.) See
also, Dalley, supra note 2 at 409 (listing reasons for the rule that statements of opinion are not actionable,
including difficulties of proof and the fact that such statements were too common to be reasonably relied
on) and at 419 (arguing that statements of intention are not actionable). Two long-standing exceptions to
this rule exist: first, disclosure of expert opinions is normally required, and second the doctrine of
promissory fraud requires the disclosure of an intention to breach.
27
See, e.g., Gulian C. Verplanck, An Essay on the Doctrine of Contracts: Being An Inquiry How Contracts
Are Affected in Law and Morals by Concealment, Error, or Inadequate Price 119-20 (1825); Paula J.
Dalley, From Horse Trading To Insider Trading: The Historical Antecedents of the Insider Trading
Debate, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1289, 1328 (1998).
10

My knowledge of my own interests, and my personal necessities,
my sagacity, natural or acquired, in forming judgments of the state of the
market; in brief, all that has been above summed up as constituting the
facts and reasoning of a bargain, peculiar to each individual, can never be
expected by the other party to be communicated . . . .28
To illustrate, Verplanck hypothesizes a director of a large insurance company who
believes, from his observations and knowledge of the insurance industry and his own
institution, that the insurance business is “overdone” and that current premiums are an
inadequate compensation for the risks assumed by insurers.29 If he sells his insurance
stock to a purchaser with less knowledge of the industry than he, the director is under no
duty to disclose his opinion (with which other informed parties might reasonably
disagree) that the stock is overpriced.30 If, on the other hand, the undisclosed information
concerns losses in the insurance company that have depleted half its capital (a verifiable
fact), disclosure would be required.31
Although we predicted that courts are less likely to find that the informed party
owed the uninformed party a duty to disclose when the withheld information related to a
personal opinion or intention, we also predicted that such cases were relatively rare,
given the widespread agreement among commentators that such information is not
required to be disclosed. In addition, as regards allegations of a failure to disclose
personal opinions, there is a second reason to predict that these sorts of cases are rare.
Because most opinions are founded on underlying facts, we predicted that well-plead
suits generally allege fraudulent nondisclosure of these facts, rather than of the opinion
itself. In other words, because plaintiffs (or, more accurately, their counsel) should plead
28

Verplanck, supra note 27 at 119.
Id. at 121-22.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 122. Verplanck’s hypothetical could also be explained on the grounds that courts distinguish
between intrinsic and extrinsic facts, or that the parties lack equal access to information regarding the lost
capital, whereas information regarding the general state of the insurance industry is theoretically available
to everyone. Similarly, Professor Paula Dalley illustrates the common law rule regarding the disclosure of
personal intentions through the example of a horse trade. Dalley, supra note 2 at 128. In her example, the
29
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those claims that have some chance of success, we predicted that relatively few cases
alleging a failure to disclose a personal opinion would be present in our dataset. Instead,
plaintiffs intent on increasing their chances of success should plead a failure to disclose
the underlying facts on which the opinion was based.32
3. The undisclosed information related to a latent defect
One of the most common theories employed by commentators to explain the
results in nondisclosure cases concerns the difference between latent and patent defects.
As with so many of our variables, commentators seem to agree that there is a greater duty
to disclose latent, as opposed to patent, defects, but disagree as to the rationale for the
distinction.33
In order to distinguish the concept of latent defect from that of unequal access to
information, we employ the term “latent defect” narrowly in this article, as a term of art.
Accordingly, as defined here, only property (including slaves) can be subject to a latent
defect – the term does not apply to all undisclosed and difficult to access information.34
For example, an undisclosed illness or injury affecting a person would not qualify as a
latent defect in an application for insurance or employment, but would constitute a latent

fact that the horse seller shortly plans to leave town and is thus willing to accept any price for the horse is
personal information that need not be disclosed. Id.
32
To illustrate, consider the case of Bob, whose brother is a member of the town counsel that has just
approved a new highway through what was previously farm land. If Bob, aware of these plans, buys a tract
of farm land in the area of the proposed highway from Sally without disclosing this information, Sally has
several options. First, she could allege that Bob failed to disclose his opinion that prices of farm land
would soon rise. Alternatively, she could allege that Bob failed to disclose his knowledge of the proposed
highway gained from his brother. Due to the widespread agreement among commentators that a failure to
disclose personal opinions is not actionable, we predicted relatively few cases of the first type, as plaintiffs
have the option of pleading the latter type of case and, according to commentators, are more likely to meet
with success in this manner.
33
Compare, e.g., Kronman, supra note 1 at 25 (arguing that requiring sellers to disclose latent – but not
patent -- defects is an economically efficient policy because sellers typically casually acquire information
regarding latent defects and because requiring the disclosure of obvious defects increases transaction costs)
with Scheppele, supra note 2 at 134-37 (arguing that the distinction between latent and patent defects is
best justified on the grounds that latent defects are typically inaccessible to one of the parties – generally
the buyer.)
34
See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (discussing fraudulent silence in slave sales).
12

defect in the sale of a slave.35 Similarly, in a stock transaction, the fact that the issuer is
about to become the subject of a takeover bid, thus raising the stock price significantly,
would not be considered a “defect,” although the information is certainly relevant to the
transaction and would greatly affect the purchase price. Consistent with the assertions of
legal scholars, we predicted that courts are more likely to impose disclosure duties when
the withheld information relates to a latent defect.
4. The information concerned a defect likely to cause bodily injury or
property damage
It has been argued that the law traditionally has taken a stricter view with regard
to information that, if disclosed, could prevent the occurrence of bodily injury or property
damage, as opposed to information that, if disclosed, would avoid mere economic loss.36
The distinction seems defensible from an economic standpoint, as there may be
circumstances when it would be inefficient for the law to correct an economic loss of one
party (such as, for example, in some circumstances when the informed party has
expended time and effort to acquire the information), whereas the same efficiency
argument cannot generally be made with regard to the prevention of bodily injury or
property damage.
For example, in older cases, courts may require the disclosure of information
concerning the presence of small pox or other dangerous germs, which, if known by the
uninformed party, could have prevented the contraction and spread of the disease.37

35

Compare Huntington v. Brown, 17 La. Ann. 48 (1865) (sale of diseased slave coded as latent defect);
Smith v. Rowzee, 10 Ky. 527 (1821) (same) with Leclerc v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 93 N.H. 234,
39 A.2d 763 (1944) (illness in applicant for insurance not coded as latent defect). In both cases, however,
information regarding the undisclosed injury or illness might be accessible to only one party, meaning that
the parties had unequal access to the information.
36
Keeton, supra note 22 at 14-17, 36. Apparently, this reasoning dates back at least to the time of St.
Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas argued that vendors should be required to reveal defects in the good sold if “the
vice be of a nature to cause the vendee some injury.” See Pothier, supra note 12 at Art. I, No. 238
(criticizing Aquinas’s restrictive view of disclosure duties).
37
See, e.g., Leech v. Husbands, 152 A. 729, 733 (Del. Super. Ct. 1930) (failure of landlord to disclose that
residence was "infested with vermin, bugs and disease germs” constituted fraud, although tenant waived
right to relief by failing to sue within reasonable time after discovering defect); Cowen v. Sunderland, 145
13

Modern examples may include the duty of tobacco companies to disclose the health risks
associated with cigarette smoking38 and the duty of sellers of real property to disclose the
presence of asbestos or lead paint.39 Because this rule seems sensible from a policy
perspective and can be traced back at least to the fourteenth century, we predicted that,
when the failure to disclose information is likely to cause physical injury or property
damage, courts are more likely to rule that a duty to disclose exists.

5. The information would have updated or corrected previously disclosed
information40
Mass. 363, 364, 14 N.E. 117, 118 (1887) (stating that “[i]t has thus been held that where one lets premises
infected with the
small-pox, and injury occurred thereby, he was liable if, knowing this danger, he omitted to inform the
lessee”). See also, Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865, 865 (8th Cir. 1903) (stating that,
“[a] manufacturer or vendor, who, without giving notice of its character or qualities, supplies or delivers to
another a machine or article which, at the time of delivery, he knows to be imminently dangerous to the life
or limbs of any one who may use it for the purpose for which it is intended, is liable to any one who
sustains injury from its dangerous condition, whether he has any contractual relations with him or not.”)
38
Congress probably pre-empted any state common law duties of cigarette manufacturers to disclose the
health risks associated with smoking tobacco with the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of
1965, as amended by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969. Together, these statutes provide
that, “[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with
respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity
with the provisions of this chapter.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 1334 (1965). The Supreme Court has held that these
statutes pre-empt state law claims based on a failure to disclose material health risks to consumers through
advertising or promotion. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992). In theory, claims based on
a failure to disclose through other channels the health risks associated with smoking are not preempted.
C.f. Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 884 F.Supp. 1515, 1521 (D. Kan. 1995) (refusing to dismiss
plaintiff’s fraud claim alleging that “the defendants knew that use of their products caused cancer and
vasculatory disease, yet willfully chose to conceal those facts from the public,” and noting that “it is
possible that plaintiff can assert viable claims” of fraud at trial.)
39
Kezer v. Mark Stimson Associates, 742 A.2d 898, 903 (Me. 1999) (applying a Maine law that requires
the disclosure of the existence of all hazardous material including asbestos and lead based paint); Stanley J.
Levy, Asbestos and the Real Estate Industry the Legacy of the Magic Mineral, 339 Practicing L. Inst. 7,30
(1989) (stating that because of its dangerous qualities a duty to disclose the known existence of asbestos
may be found). But see, Justice v. Anderson County, 955 S.W.2d 613 (1997) (finding that the purchasers
of a school building were not entitled to rescind the sales contract on the grounds that the property’s
vendors -- the county and school district -- fraudulently concealed the presence of asbestos in the building,
when the building was purchased “as is” at a public auction, the transaction was arm's length, there was no
fiduciary relationship between the parties, and the presence of asbestos was reasonably discoverable by
purchasers).
40
Although many courts and commentators discussing the common law of nondisclosure do not distinguish
between the duty to update and the duty to correct, federal courts and commentators applying or discussing
the federal securities laws consider the distinction important, particularly as not all courts recognize a duty
to update under the federal securities laws. See, Donald C. Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken
Inferences by Investors and Others, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 87, 118 (1999) (noting that the second and third
circuits recognize a duty to update “forward looking” information under some circumstances.)
The court in Oran v. Stafford explained the distinction between the duty to update and the duty to
correct well: “The duty to correct exists ‘when a company makes a historical statement that, at the time
made, the company believed to be true, but as revealed by subsequently discovered information actually
14

A duty to correct may arise if a statement is false when made, although the
speaker believes the information to be correct. If the speaker subsequently discovers that
the information earlier disclosed was false, he may have a duty to correct that
information.
By contrast, a duty to update may arise if a statement is correct when made, but
later developments subsequently render the statement incorrect or misleading. A duty to
update the previously correct statement might arise in some cases.41 Section 551 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes both a duty to correct and a duty to update, by
stating that a party to a business transaction is under an obligation to disclose
“subsequently acquired information that he knows will make untrue or misleading a
previous representation that when made was true or believed to be so.”42 We predicted
that cases involving information that would have updated or corrected previously
disclosed information were more likely to result in a finding that the informed party owed
the uninformed party a duty to disclose.
B. The Type of Transaction
Commentators have also asserted that the degree of required disclosure depends on
the type of transaction in question. In particular, it has been asserted that courts require
heightened disclosure in the case of transactions between parties in a confidential or
fiduciary relationship, transactions concerning the acquisition of insurance, surety, or a
release from liability, transactions in which the parties have unequal access to
was not.’ The duty to update, in contrast, ‘concerns statements that, although reasonable at the time made,
become misleading when viewed in the context of subsequent events.’” Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 286
(2000) (citations omitted).
We coded the duty to update and the duty to correct together, rather than separately, due to the
difficulty of distinguishing one from the other, particularly in cases where the court did not distinguish
between the two, or confused the two issues.
41
Wilson, supra note 14 at 236 (stating that, “where one party has made a material misrepresentation which
is true at the time, but which subsequently, to his knowledge, but not the knowledge of the other, becomes,
through the alteration of circumstances, untrue, it is his imperative duty to communicate to the other
information of the change in affairs.”)
15

information, transactions concerning the transfer of real property, and transactions
concerning the sale or transfer of a slave.
1. A transaction between parties in a confidential or fiduciary relationship
The most commonly asserted basis for the imposition of a duty to disclose
material information is the presence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship between
the parties to the transaction.43 Technically, confidential relationships (or “relationships
of trust and confidence” as they are typically labeled) differ from fiduciary relationships
in that a fiduciary relationship arises out of the position of the parties relative to each
other, while a confidential relationship arises from the conduct of the parties or from the
nature of the transaction that is the subject of the dispute.44 For purposes of this article,
however, the distinction is irrelevant. Our hypothesis is that both types of relationships
lead to greater disclosure requirements than do arms-length relationships, and
accordingly, we make no attempt to distinguish fiduciary relationships from those that are
merely confidential.
Unfortunately, although the fiduciary character of some relationships is clear -such as principal and agent, corporate officer or director and shareholder, or trustee and
beneficiary -- the fiduciary or confidential nature of other relationships is not so clear, or
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Rest. 2d Torts §551(2)(c).
See, e.g., Story, supra note 18 at §218; Bay Colony, Ltd. v. Trendmaker, Inc. 121 F.3d 998 (5th Cir.
1997) (stating that Texas law recognizes a duty to disclose which supports action for fraud by
nondisclosure only where fiduciary or confidential relationship exists); Banque Arabe et Internationale
D'Investissement v. Maryland Nat. Bank, 57 F.3d 146 (2nd Cir. 1995) (holding that an affirmative duty to
disclose arises from the need to complete a partial statement or from a fiduciary or confidential relationship
between the parties).
44
For example, the relationship between two family members may or may not be confidential depending on
factors such as whether they typically entrust confidential information to one another or whether they enjoy
a congenial relationship. In contrast, because of the status of a trust manager as a fiduciary to the trust
beneficiary, the trust manager owes the trust beneficiary a fiduciary duty that cannot be diminished through
daily interactions that suggest the relationship is not one of trust and confidence. See, George Gleeson
Bogert, Confidential Relations and Unenforceable Express Trusts, 13 Cornell L. Q. 237, 248 (1928)
(discussing the difference between confidential and fiduciary relationships); Richard W. Painter, Kimberly
D. Krawiec, & Cynthia A. Williams, Don’t Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United States v. O’Hagan,
84 Va. L. Rev. 153, 176-177, n.101-03 (1998) (same).
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might vary from state to state or across the time frame of our study.45 In fact, courts have
purposely failed to provide an exhaustive list of fiduciary relationships, preferring instead
loose standards that allow judges to consider the specific facts of each case.46 In order to
avoid the difficulties and subjective decisions that could lead to errors in coding such
cases, we adopted bright-line rules that suit the purposes of our study, but might not
technically conform to the law.
For example, the traditional common law rule was that corporate officers and
directors owed fiduciary duties only to the corporation itself or to the shareholders as a
unit, and not to the individual shareholders of the corporation.47 Accordingly, courts often
ruled that officers and directors could trade with shareholders based on material nonpublic information without disclosing such information.48 On the other hand, some
courts, often invoking the “special facts” doctrine, refused to permit such transactions by
corporate officers and directors without full disclosure.49 Because fiduciary obligations
45

A common (but not exhaustive) list of recognized fiduciary relationships would include: executors,
guardians, trustees, attorneys, and, to an extent, corporate directors and senior executives. See, John C.
Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of Fiduciary Breaches and the
Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 117, 150 (1981).
46
See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 45 (stating that, “[t]he common law has in fact, always defined the term
[fiduciary] with deliberate imprecision . . . .”); Karen E. Boxx, The Durable Power of Attorney's Place in
the Family of Fiduciary Relationships, 36 Ga. L. Rev. 1, 15 (2001) ("A clear characterization of fiduciary
obligation is elusive and its exact nature is much debated."); Harper v. Adametz, 113 A.2d. 136, 225
(Conn. 1955) (stating that the court has purposefully refrained from defining a fiduciary relationship in
precise detail that would exclude new situations).
47
Smith v. Hurd, 53 Mass. 371 (1847) (stating that, “[t]here is no legal privity, relation, or immediate
connection, between the holders of shares in a bank, in their individual capacity, on the one side, and the
directors of the bank on the other. The directors are not the bailees, the factors, agents or trustees of such
individual stockholders.”); Allen v. Curtis, 26 Conn. 456 (1857) (holding that “the directors of the bank are
the agents of the bank. The bank is the only principal, and there is no such trust for, or relation to, a
stockholder as has been claimed by the plaintiff.”); Board of Com'rs of Tippecanoe County v. Reynolds, 15
Am. Rep. 245 (1873) (stating that directors owe the shareholders as a unit a fiduciary duty when dealing
with the corporation’s business or property, but that no such duty is owed by an officer or director to an
individual shareholder when transacting for the purchase or sale of stock in the corporation).
48
Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 191 (7th Cir. 1979) (stating that, [a]bsent fraud, the traditional common
law approach has been to permit officers and directors of corporations to trade in their corporation's
securities free from liability to other traders for failing to disclose inside information.”); Adams v. MidWest Chevrolet Corp., 179 P.2d 147, 156 (1946) (stating that, “[t]he general rule is that officers and
directors . . . cannot deal with the property of the corporation for their own personal benefit or advantage.
But this duty does not extend to the outstanding stock of the corporation for the reason that such stock is
the individual property of the respective shareholders and not in any sense the corporation's property”).
49
Freeman, supra note 48 at 191 (stating that, [a] few jurisdictions now require disclosure where certain
"special facts" exist, and some even impose a strict fiduciary duty on the insider vis-à-vis the selling
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to individual shareholders were not recognized at this time, some commentators have
used these cases as evidence that courts apply an equality of access doctrine to determine
when disclosure will be required.50
We believe, however, that such cases are better understood as a precursor to
today’s doctrine of officer and director fiduciary duties rather than as evidence of a broad
insistence by courts that parties to transactions have equal access to information. We thus
coded these cases as fiduciary duty cases (in addition, in most instances, as unequal
access cases), despite the fact that the court might not have invoked this rationale, and
might even have specifically rejected it.
Similarly, whether some relationships are confidential in nature vary from state to
state or with the specific circumstances of the relationship. An examination of the law
governing marital relations helps to illustrate the point. Some states consider marriage an
inherently fiduciary relationship while others hold that marital relations might or might
not be confidential, depending on the circumstances.51 Some states hold that a fiduciary
or confidential relationship automatically begins with engagement, while others do not.52

shareholder.”); Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909) (stating, “[t]hat the defendant was a director of the
corporation is but one of the facts upon which the liability is asserted, the existence of all the others in
addition making such a combination as rendered it the plain duty of the defendant to speak”). Those other
facts included that Rapide owned 75% of the stock of the company, was administrator general of the
company, was the chief negotiator for the company in talks that eventually led to the sale of all of the
company’s property, and was in reality acting as an agent for all of the other shareholders in such
negotiations. Id.
50
See, e.g., Strong, supra note 49 (holding that agents of Repide, the chief shareholder and director of the
Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company, should have disclosed to prospective sellers of the
company’s shares that they were acting on behalf of Repide, who was also the company’s chief negotiator
for a U.S. government contract); Scheppele, supra note 2 at 113-114 (arguing that the Court’s ruling in
Strong v. Repide is explainable on equal access grounds, and not on fiduciary duty grounds, because the
court explicitly rejected the proposition that corporate directors owe shareholders special disclosure
obligations.)
51
Compare, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004
(1992) (finding that marriage is not per se a fiduciary relationship) with DeLorean v. DeLorean, 511 A.2d
1257, 1261-62 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986) (finding that marriage is a fiduciary relationship).
52
Compare, e.g., In re Marriage of Sokolowski, 597 N.E.2d 675, 680 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (finding that a
confidential relationship begins at engagement under Illinois law), and Lightman v Magid, 54 Tenn. App.
701, 394 S.W.2d. 151 (1965) (finding that a confidential relationship ordinarily exists at engagement), with
Handley v Handley, 113 Cal. App. 2d. 280, 248 P.2d. 59 (1952) (holding that confidential relationship
could not exists prior to marriage)
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And courts differ in the extent to which they treat married but separated persons as
parties to a confidential or fiduciary relationship.53
To avoid the daunting task of mastering the intricacies of the law of confidential
relations in all fifty states, as well as the necessity of subjective judgment calls
concerning whether the circumstances of a particular relationship make it confidential,
we adopted bright-line rules that reflected the weight of authority and applied them
across all jurisdictions. We thus, for example, treated engaged persons negotiating a
prenuptial agreement as parties to a confidential relationship in all 50 states, despite the
fact that this is not the law in all jurisdictions under all circumstances. This bright-line
approach did not trouble us, given our hypothesis that, despite asserted differences across
jurisdictions in the law of confidential relations, as a general matter, courts impose a
heavier disclosure obligation in cases where the relation between the parties could be
considered fiduciary or confidential, such as, for example, a familial or marital
relationship, than they do when the parties share a merely arms-length relationship. We
thus predicted a significant, positive relationship between the likelihood of the court
imposing disclosure duties and the existence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship.
2. The transaction concerned insurance, surety, or a release from liability
Professor W. Page Keeton described this theory best: “In releases, in contracts of
insurance, and in contracts of suretyship, practically all facts affecting the matter must be
disclosed.”54 The most commonly asserted rationale for this rule, particularly as regards

53

Compare, e.g., Harroff v. Harroff, 398 S.E.2d 340, 343 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that married
persons owe each other fiduciary duties while negotiating a separation agreement) with In re Marriage of
Auble, 866 P.2d 1239, 1244 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that married persons living apart do not owe each
other fiduciary duties in the negotiation of a separation agreement).
54
Keeton, supra note 22 at 36; Wilson, supra note 14 at 231. But see, Scheppele, supra note 2 at 148
(arguing that when the insurer and insured have equal access to information, disclosure is not required.)
19

insurance, is that the insured is likely to have knowledge affecting the contract that is
unavailable to the insurance underwriter.55
Some modern commentators have urged the abolition of the rule of full disclosure
in insurance contracts on the grounds that the rule originated in the context of maritime
insurance, when vessels were typically insured once they were already at sea and could
not be inspected.56 Accordingly, they argue that such rules have no place in modern
insurance practice, in which the insurance company is typically able to and does conduct
a thorough inspection of the insured property or person.57 Nonetheless, we predicted that
courts are more likely to find a duty to disclose when the transaction concerns the
acquisition of insurance, surety, or a release from liability.
3. The transaction was one in which the parties had unequal access to
information
One of the most lasting, if controversial, theories seeking to explain why courts
require disclosure of all material facts in some transactions but not others is the theory
that courts will require disclosure whenever the parties have unequal access to
information (the “equality of access theory”).58 Professor Kim Lane Scheppele has
elegantly defined equal access in terms of both structural equality and equality of
55

Scheppele, supra note 2 at 146-148; Verplanck, supra note 27 at 37-38 (stating that, “[t]he insured being
the party from whom, in most cases, the underwriter obtains the special facts upon which the calculation of
the risk is settled . . . [e]very fact within his knowledge, regarding which ignorance or mistake might
possibly induce the underwriter to compute his risk upon an incorrect basis . . . is considered by the law as
a material fact, and misrepresentation or suppression of it avoids the policy.”) But see, Kronman, supra
note 1 at 27 (explaining the rule that health or life insurance applicants owe the insurer a duty of full candor
on the grounds that information regarding the health of the applicant is nearly always casually acquired).
56
See, e.g., Bertram Harnett, The Doctrine of Concealment: A Remnant of the Law of Insurance, 15 L. &
Contemp. Probs. 391-414 (1950).
57
Id.
58
Am. Jur. 2d §148 (asserting that, “[t]here is abundant authority to the effect that if one party to a contract
or transaction has superior knowledge, or knowledge which is not within the fair and reasonable reach of
the other party and which he could not discover by the exercise of reasonable diligence, or means of
knowledge which are not open to both parties alike, he is under a legal obligation to speak”); Victor
Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 Harv.
L. Rev. 322 (1979) (defining equality of access as an informational advantage that cannot be overcome by
the uninformed party, regardless of her diligence or monetary resources.); Carter v. Boehm, 3 Burr. (1905)
(opinion of Lord Mansfield, stating that “either party may be innocently silent as to grounds open to both to
exercise their judgment upon.”); Wilson, supra note 14 at 234 (stating that, “the common law imposes no
duty of disclosure where the facts suppressed are equally accessible to both parties to the transaction.”)
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aptitude. For example, she states that “[t]wo actors will be said to have equal access to
information if they (1) have equal probabilities of finding the information if they put forth
the same level of effort and (2) are capable of making this equivalent level of effort.”59
People most often have different probabilities of information detection because of
structural inequality – in other words, they “have structurally unequal access to
knowledge.”60 In contrast, when two people are unable to expend the same level of effort
in information production, it is most often because one does not even realize that the
information might exist, or is too lacking in intellectual capability or social knowledge to
compete with more sophisticated parties.61
Relying on Laidlaw to underpin her theory, Scheppele points to Justice Marshall’s
dictum that “[i]t would be difficult to circumscribe the contrary doctrine [i.e., the doctrine
that the relative access of the parties to the information is legally relevant] within proper
limits, where the means of intelligence are equally accessible to both parties” to develop
an argument that the case outcome can be explained by the fact that the parties had equal
access to information. This assumption might seem surprising, given the clear evidence
that, due to Organ’s special connection to the only three people in New Orleans with
knowledge of the end of the war, Laidlaw could not have discovered the information
without expending considerably more effort than that exerted by Organ. However,
Scheppele argues that Organ’s discovery of the information was purely fortuitous –
Laidlaw was just as likely as Organ to have a partner with a brother aboard the British
fleet who came ashore during the night with news that the war had ended.62
Despite the admirable efforts of Professor Scheppele, the equality of access
theory remains extraordinarily open-ended and subjective, a fact leading many critics,
59

Scheppele, supra note 2 at 120.
Id.
61
Id. at 121.
60
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including one of the present authors, to dismiss the test as providing no meaningful
guidance for courts.63 Needless to say, reasonable minds can wildly differ on what
constitutes equal access and coding for a factor so susceptible to personal interpretation
was difficult.
Nonetheless, we attempted to address the problem by laying down bright-line
rules. Most importantly, in contrast to Scheppele, we defined access as purely structural.
Even gross differences in education or knowledge did not impact our determination of
whether equality of access was lacking. Instead, we dealt with differences such as these
by including a separate code for parties who are illiterate, elderly, severely ill, or
extraordinarily mentally deficient in some way (although still competent to contract).64
Furthermore, we did not, as some commentators might, automatically code
purchasers and sellers of real or personal property as having unequal access to
information. Instead, if a casual inspection of the property would have revealed the
undisclosed information, then we concluded that the parties had equal access to the
information in question, despite the fact that purchasers must have sellers’ permission
before inspecting the property. We felt that this definition was reasonable, given the ease
with which the purchaser could request and execute such an inspection, and the suspicion
that should arise in the purchaser’s mind if the seller refuses the request. This equality of
access theory leads us to predict that courts are more likely to impose disclosure duties
when the parties have unequal access to the withheld information.

62

Id. at 122 (stating that, “ [i]t seems that Organ got his information through a friend who had a brother in
the know. Laidlaw’s agent, if he had had the same fortune, also could have got the information this way.”)
63
For example, one of the present authors has argued previously that, because both individual aptitude and
structural access vary across the population in relation to wealth and education, no two people are ever
truly equal. Instead, access is a continuum on which cases of clear inequality or relative equality can be
identified at the extremes, but that none of the definitions endorsed by the equality of access advocates
gives meaningful guidance as to where to draw the line in the large majority of cases, which fall in the
middle of the continuum. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency & Insider Trading: Deconstructing
the Coin of the Realm in the Information Age, 95 Nw. U.L. Rev. 443 (2001); Ian Ayres & Stephen Choi,
Internalizing Outsider Trading, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 313 (2002) (raising a similar argument).
64
See infra note 92and accompanying text (discussing this variable).
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4. The transaction concerned the transfer of real property
It has been argued by some commentators that courts impose a greater duty of
disclosure with regard to the transfer of real property than in other types of transactions, a
rule that apparently dates back to the Roman civil law.65 At common law, this rule might
have been the result of implied warranties of habitability and title.66 In many states today,
much of the common law in this area has been superceded by statutes that mandate high
levels of disclosure in real estate transactions, particularly residential ones. We predicted
that courts are more likely to impose a duty to disclose when the transaction concerns the
transfer of real property.
5. The Transaction Concerned the Transfer of a Slave
Slavery cases of all kinds have understandably generated significant interest not only
in the legal literature, but in history and economics as well.67 Although one might expect
that courts would formulate different disclosure rules in slave sale cases than in other sale
of goods cases, in recognition of the fact that the property at issue is a human being, a
review of the cases should quickly disabuse the reader of that notion.
For example, courts could have used the rule that bargaining parties have a duty to
disclose defects likely to cause personal injury as a basis for imposing a duty to disclose
any illness or injury in a slave, the rationale being that lack of disclosure prevents the
purchaser from seeking medical attention for the slave. Instead, however, courts of the
65

See, e.g., Cicero, supra note 10 at ¶65 (stating that, “[a]s far as estates are concerned, it is laid down in
our civil law that all faults known to the seller be declared at the time of the sale.”) See generally, John V.
Orth, Sale of Defective Houses, 6 Greenbag 163 (2003) (discussing the common law of disclosure in
connection with the sale of real property).
66
As to title, see Pothier at Art. II, No. 240 (declaring that the vendor must declare “that the thing does not
belong to him; that it does not belong to him irrevocably; or that it is subject to certain charges, annuities
(rentes), or special hypothecations.”)
67
See, e.g., Jenny B. Wahl, The Jurisprudence of American Slave Sales, 56 (1) J. Econ. Hist. 143 (1996);
Helen T. Catterall, Judicial Cases Concerning American Slavery and the Negro (1968); Andrew Fede,
Legal Protection for Slave Buyers in the U.S. South: A Caveat Concerning Caveat Emptor, 31 (4) Am. J.
Legal Hist. 322 (1987); Judith K. Shafer, Guaranteed against the Vices and Maladies of Precribed by Law:
Consumer Protection, the Law of Slave Sales, and the Supreme Court in Antebellum Louisiana, 31 (4) Am.
J. Legal Hist. 306 (1987); Judith K. Schafer, Slavery, the Civil Law, and the Supreme Court of Louisiana
(1994); Mark Tushnet, New Histories of the Private Law of Slavery, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 301 (1996).
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era deciding disclosure issues seem to have treated slaves much like any other personal
property.68
This is not to say, however, that special disclosure rules did not arise in connection
with slavery cases. In fact, economic and legal historians have argued that, although the
southern states generally observed a rule of strict caveat emptor much more frequently
than did the northeastern states, due to the importance of the slave trade to the southern
economy, southern states attempted to regulate the slavery market, in part by imposing
disclosure duties on parties to a slave sale.69 Interestingly, this rule too dates back to
Roman law.70 We predicted that courts are more likely to find that the informed party
has a duty to disclose when the transaction involves the sale of a slave.
C. How the Information Was Acquired
Many commentators have argued that the method by which the undisclosed
information was acquired has an impact on whether courts require disclosure of the
information. Specifically, it has been asserted that courts more frequently require the
disclosure of casually acquired information, and information acquired through illegal or
tortious means.
1. The information was casually, as opposed to deliberately, acquired

68

In fact, the argument that illness or injury in a slave falls within the well-recognized exception for
disclosures of defects likely to cause bodily injury was not raised in any of the cases in our dataset,
presumably because of the deeply ingrained notion among many southerners of that era (including judges
and counsel in the cases) that the southern legal system treats slaves as goods, rather than as individuals
whose well-being should be protected by the legal system. See also, Wahl, supra note 67 at 146, n.7
(referring to livestock sales as slave sales’ “closest relative”).
69
See, e.g., Wahl, supra note 67 at 146-148 (arguing that southern courts imposed higher disclosure
obligations in slave sales than in other sales transactions); Fede, supra note 67 at 322-58 (arguing that slave
sales were more heavily policed by the courts, who imposed protections such as warranties of titles and
soundness, foreshadowing the development of the UCC). But see, Dalley, supra note 2 at 430 (finding less
protection of buyers against fraud in slave cases than in some other types of cases, such as those involving
land, horses, and corporate securities.)
70
Cicero, supra note 10 at ¶71 (stating that “[i]t is not only in the sale of real estate that civil law, which is
based on the natural law, condemns trickery and fraud, but also in the case of slave-purchase the buyer is
protected by law against deception. Indeed, an edict of the aediles lays down that if the seller knows that
the slave is a weakling, a runaway or a thief, he must (except in the case of an inherited slave) declare it”).
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Although the notion that the law should reward those who expend time and effort
to acquire information by permitting them to reap the benefits of bargaining with others
without revealing that information was propounded perhaps most eloquently (and
certainly most famously) by Anthony Kronman, this economic justification for the
differing results in fraudulent silence cases is, in fact, one of the earliest theories offered
by legal commentators attempting to explain the law of fraudulent silence. For example,
in De Officiis, Cicero constructs a hypothetical in which a merchant sails to Rhodes from
Alexandria with a shipment of corn during a time of great famine in Rhodes.71 The
merchant knows that other ships have set sail from Alexandria to Rhodes with enough
corn to alleviate the famine and will arrive shortly. In an imaginary dialogue, the Stoic
philosophers Antipater and Diogenes debate whether or not the merchant should be
required to reveal all that he knows.72
Discussing the hypothetical in his 1761 Treatise on Obligations, the French legal
theorist R.J. Pothier agrees with Cicero’s conclusion that the merchant should disclose his
secret information. He acknowledges, however, that the majority of other writers on the
subject have considered the merchant’s profits to be made by nondisclosure, “not an
unjust profit; but a just reward for the diligence which enabled him to arrive the first, and
the risk which he ran of losing his merchandise, if any of the accidents, to which he was
exposed, should have prevented his arrival on time.”73 Similarly, writing in 1936,
Professor W. Page Keeton argued that the manner in which the informed party acquired
her information is relevant to courts’ determinations of disclosure duties, noting that,
“[t]he information might have been acquired as a result of his bringing to bear superior
71

Cicero, supra note 10 at ¶ 50.
Cicero, supra note 10 at ¶¶ 51-53. In the hypothetical, Antipater argues that, “he should tell everything,
so that the buyer can be just as much in possession of the facts as the seller.” Id. at ¶51. Diogenes
responds that, “these bonds [of social unity] are not such that a man may not have anything to call his own.
If that is so, there is not even any selling to be done, only giving.” Id. at ¶ 53.
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knowledge, intelligence, skill, or technical judgment,” or “it might have been acquired by
mere chance.”74
Kronman elaborated on this theory by arguing that the seemingly inconsistent
results in similar cases involving the nondisclosure of relevant facts could be reconciled
by noting that when nondisclosure is permitted, the knowledge involved is typically the
result of a deliberate search.75 Although Kronman conceded that Organ’s information
appeared to be acquired fortuitously, rather than deliberately (recall that Organ’s business
partner’s brother had been at sea with the British fleet and arrived in New Orleans during
the middle of the night, tipping Organ about the soon-to-be-disclosed news of the war’s
end), he believed that this did not undermine his theory. Instead, Kronman argued that
Marshall’s decision resulted from an attempt to lay down a blanket rule concerning the
disclosure of market information, which is typically, though not always, deliberately
acquired.
Kronman argued that a rule permitting silence in such instances was a sensible
economic policy, as it represented the only effective means of providing incentives for
the production of costly information that would not normally be discovered, absent a
deliberate search.76 Requiring the disclosure of casually acquired information, by
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Pothier, supra note 12 at Art. III., No. 242. Pothier, although agreeing with Cicero’s conclusions, also
notes that, “[t]he decision of Cicero meets with much difficulty even in the forum of conscience. The
greater number of those who have written upon natural law have regarded it as going too far.” Id.
74
Keeton, supra note 22 at 25. See also, Wilson, supra note 14 at 231 (stating that, “the common law . . .
declares that men should as a general rule take care of themselves, and that some incentive to diligence and
discretion in their affairs should be afforded, by giving them, in ordinary transactions, the benefit of their
industry and discernment.”); Hays v. Meyers, 107 S.W. 287, 288 (1908) (stating that a party has no duty to
disclose “the superior knowledge of property he desires to purchase that has been acquired by skill, energy,
vigilance, and other legitimate means” and stating further that “[i]f any other rule were adopted, it would
have a depressing tendency on trade and commerce by removing the incentive to speculation and profit that
lies at the foundation of almost every business venture”).
75
Kronman, supra note 1 at 9. Although Kronman limited his theory to “socially productive information,”
we find this distinction unnecessary to test his hypothesis. In practice, it is difficult to conceive of
examples of failures to disclose socially unproductive information that would result in demonstrable
damages to the plaintiff, thus resulting in litigation and written judicial opinions.
76
Id.
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contrast, should not alter the informed party’s discovery of information, because he
expended no resources to find it.
Like Kronman, we define “deliberately acquired information” as “information
whose acquisition entails costs which would not have been incurred but for the
likelihood, however great, that the information in question would actually be
produced.”77 The costs of acquiring such information might include not only direct
search costs, but also the costs of developing any needed expertise, such as, for example,
the costs of attending business school or studying the values of art or antiques.78
Casually acquired information, by contrast, is information the acquisition of
which entails costs that would have been incurred even if the information were not
forthcoming.79 To illustrate, a businessman who overhears information while riding on a
bus has acquired the information casually, except in the unlikely event that he rides buses
specifically for that purpose.80
Kronman recognized that, although theoretically interesting, the determination as
to whether or not any given piece of information was deliberately or casually acquired in
any instance was a difficult one for courts to make in the real world.81 Accordingly, he
argued that, rather than making case by case determinations as to the manner of
information acquisition, it would be more efficient for courts to adopt blanket rules
regarding whether the kind of information involved in a particular class of case (say, real
estate purchases, or the sale of a good with a latent defect) was more likely to be
generated deliberately or casually.82
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Id. at 13.
Id. at 13.
79
Id. at 13.
80
Id. at 13, n.38 and accompanying text.
81
Kronman, supra note 1 at 13-14.
82
Kronman, supra note 1 at 17-18.
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In contrast, we judged whether information was casually or deliberately acquired
based on the facts of each case, as opposed to the class of case in question. We did this
for several reasons. First, although Kronman does discuss general rules as to the likely
means of information acquisition in certain classes of cases (for example, market
information, the knowledge of purchasers and sellers of real property, and information
relating to the health of an applicant for health or life insurance), he did not lay down
general classifications for every possible range of facts. Accordingly, any attempt to
apply blanket rules would have required significant fact-specific inquiry on our part in
order to create such rules for all classes of cases contained in our sample set.
Second, coding individual cases on their own facts enabled us to test not only the
robustness of the deliberately/casually acquired distinction, but also allowed us to test
Kronman’s empirical claims as to the likely mode of information acquisition in those
classes of cases for which he did, in fact, suggest blanket rules. In other words, coding in
this manner permitted us to judge, for example, whether extrinsic information is really
typically deliberately acquired, as contended by Kronman.
Other commentators disagree that the deliberately/casually acquired information
distinction is a meaningful predictor of the outcomes of fraudulent silence cases.83 Our
own view embarking on this project was that, regardless of whether Kronman’s theory
was sound from an economic policy perspective, it was difficult to apply in practice and
had not been embraced by courts outside the Seventh Circuit.84 As a result, we predicted
no significant relationship between whether the information was casually acquired and
the likelihood that a court would impose disclosure duties.
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See, e.g., DeMott, supra note 2 at 68-69, 85; Scheppele, supra note 2 at 124-26.
The influence of Judges Easterbrook and Posner in the Seventh Circuit, their embrace of law and
economics principles, and their familiarity with academic theory led us to this hypothesis. See, e.g.,
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 877 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1056 (1990) (Judge Posner, opining that a seller had a duty to disclose material information obtained
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2. The information was acquired through illegal or tortious means
Courts and commentators often take the position that information acquired by
illegal or tortious means must be disclosed to a contracting counterparty.85 A standard
example is that if A trespasses upon B’s land and while there conducts a test and
determines that oil is located on the land, if A subsequently purchases the land from B
without disclosing to B the presence of oil on his land, B might have a right to rescind the
contract.86 We predicted that courts are significantly more likely to find a duty to
disclose when the information is acquired by illegal or tortious means.
D. Characteristics of the Uninformed Party
Commentators frequently assert that court rulings are influenced by certain
characteristics of the uninformed party. Specifically, we hypothesized that courts require
disclosure more frequently when the uninformed party is a buyer or lessee, when the
uninformed party is female, and when the uninformed party is sick, disabled, illiterate,
elderly, or otherwise severely disadvantaged in the bargaining relationship, although still
competent to contract.
1. The uninformed party was the buyer or lessee
Commentators seem to agree that sellers have a higher obligation to disclose
information affecting the value of the transaction than do purchasers, although they
disagree as to why courts make this distinction.87 Professor Keeton explained the rule as
follows:

“without substantial investment . . . which the buyer would find either impossible or very costly to discover
himself”).
85
See, e.g., Keeton, supra note 22 at 25-26; George Spencer Bower & Sir Alexander Kingcome Turner,
The Law of Actionable Misrepresentation 107 (3rd ed. 1974); Donna M. Nagy, Reframing the
Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability: A Post-O’Hagan Suggestion, 59 Ohio St. L. J. 1223,
1291-92 (1998); Mallon Oil v. Brown/Edwards Associates, 965 P.2d 105, 111-112 (Colo. 1998) (holding
that information acquired illegally must be disclosed).
86
Keeton, supra note 22 at 26; § 161 Restatement of Contracts (2d), Illustration d.11 (stating that
information acquired through trespass must be disclosed).
87
See, e.g., Kronman, supra note 1 at 22-23 (buyers have lesser disclosure obligations than sellers because
buyers are likely to acquire their information deliberately, whereas sellers are more likely to acquire their
29

The buyer is not ordinarily expected to disclose information greatly
affecting the value of the property which is the subject-matter of the sale,
whereas the seller is expected to disclose defects in the property sold
which greatly decrease the value of the property.88
We predicted that courts are significantly more likely to impose disclosure duties when
the uninformed party is the buyer.
2. The uninformed party was female
Historically, courts and legislatures have used a variety of theories to limit the
rights of women to freely contract. For example, in the early twentieth century, courts
upheld laws designed to improve working conditions for women and children against
challenges based on interference with the freedom of contract – challenges that had been
used successfully to invalidate similar laws that applied to men.89
Sometimes, the limitations on women’s freedom of contract were explicit, as
under the doctrine of coverture, which treated the family as a unit and the husband as the

information casually); Scheppele, supra note 2 at 130-33 (sellers have greater disclosure duties than do
purchasers because sellers are more likely to have access to the information in question, whereas
purchasers are not); William B. Goldfarb, Fraud & Nondisclosure in the Vendor-Purchaser Relation, 8
Western Reserve L. Rev. 5, 26 (1956) (arguing that sellers have disclosure duties that exceed those of
buyers because buyers rarely have material information unavailable to sellers); DeMott, supra note 2 at 76
(stating that “buyers in many settings are able to withhold with impunity information comparable to
information that a seller is obliged to disclose.”); Pothier, supra note 12 at Nos. 294-98 (stating that
vendees have lesser disclosure obligations than vendors, because the vendor ought to be aware of the value
of what he sells.); Andrew Kull, Unilateral Mistake: The Baseball Card Case, 70 Wash. U. L.Q. 57, 62 and
n.7 (1992) (arguing that sellers are more often found to have a duty to disclose material information
unknown to the buyer, because sellers are subject to implied warranties, whereas buyers are not).
88
Keeton, supra note 22 at 35-36.
89
Compare, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding unconstitutional a state law regulating
working hours) with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (upholding a Washington
state statute setting minimum wages for women only); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding
an Oregon statute establishing maximum working hours for women, but not for men); Commonwealth v.
Hamilton Manufacturing Company, 120 Mass. 383 (1876) (upholding a Massachusetts statute prohibiting
the employment of women and persons under the age of eighteen in any manufacturing establishment for
more than sixty hours per week); Wenham v. State, 91 N.W. 421 (Neb. 1902) (upholding a Nebraska law
regulating and limiting the employment of women in certain industries); State v. Buchanan, 70 P. 52
(Wash. 1902) (upholding a Washington state law prohibiting the employment of females in certain business
establishments for more than 10 hours per day); Com. v. Beatty, 15 Pa. Super. Ct. 5 (1900) (upholding a
Pennsylvania law criminalizing the employment of women in manufacturing establishments, mercantile
industries, and certain other venues for more than 12 hours per day or 60 hours per week). But see,
Childrens Hosp. V. Adkins, 284 F. 613, 618 (D.C. Cir. 1922) (invalidating, as inconsistent with Lochner, a
Washington, D.C., law setting minimum wages for women, but not for men.); Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E.
454 (Ill. 1895) (invalidating an Illinois law limiting the working hours of women).
30

head of that unit. Accordingly, married women were not permitted to enter into contracts
or sue or be sued in court.90
Other limitations on women’s freedom of contract might be more subtle, as when
women, due to their “delicate” nature or a perceived need to protect them from their own
bad bargains, are permitted to rescind their contracts based on protective doctrines such
as, for example, fraud, duress, or unconscionability, when the same contract would have
been enforced against a man.91 Accordingly, we hypothesized that these gendered
notions might have found their way into the law of fraudulent silence, especially in older
cases. We thus predicted that a duty to disclose secret information is more likely to be
found when the uninformed party is female than when the uninformed party is male.
3. The uninformed party was sick, disabled, illiterate, or elderly, though
competent to contract
It has been argued that, in the law of fraudulent silence, as elsewhere, courts often
rule in favor of sympathetic plaintiffs.92 Accordingly, courts might more readily impose
disclosure duties when the uninformed party is competent to contract, but is sick,
90

See generally, Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, And The Globe, 111 Yale
L.J. 619, 636 (2001) (discussing the law of coverture); Reva B. Siegel, She The People: The Nineteenth
Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, And The Family, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 947, 982-83 (2002) (same). In
theory at least, restrictions on women’s rights to contract under the doctrine of coverture were abolished
during the nineteenth century, with the widespread passage of married women’s property acts. Siegel,
supra this note at 983 (stating that “[i]t is often said that the married women's property acts abolished the
common law of coverture in the nineteenth century--a legal fiction if ever there was one. Even the briefest
look at antisuffrage discourse reveals that core concepts of coverture were a vibrant part of American legal
culture well into the twentieth century and shaped public as well as private law”).
91
See, e.g., Mary Jo Frug, Re-reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 Am. U.
L. Rev. 1065, 1085-86 (1985) (arguing that, in Jackson v. Seymour, the court allows Lucy Jackson to
rescind a contract for the sale of land to her brother because of “gendered ideas” about the vulnerability and
financial dependence of widows, rather than because of the confidential nature of their relationship);
Debora L. Threedy , Feminists & Contract Doctrine, 32 Ind. L. Rev. 1247, 1262 (1999) (stating that,
“[m]any contract doctrines are paternalistic in the sense of protecting the ‘weaker’ or disadvantaged party:
concealment, misrepresentation, unilateral mistake, undue influence, duress, unconscionability, minority,
and lack of capacity all could be said to have a protectionist cast,” and noting further that, “[f]eminists have
just begun to question whether paternalistic doctrines like unconscionability help or harm women”). But
see Margo Schlanger, Injured Women Before Common Law Courts, 1860-1930, 21 Harv. Women’s L.J. 79
(1998) (finding that courts treated gender as an important aspect in assessing standards of care giving
women fair treatment in torts).
92
C.f. DeMott, supra note 2 at 97 (stating that, “[t]o an unusual degree, judicial opinions in [these] cases . .
. personalize the parties.”); Strudler, supra note 3 at 340 (arguing that nondisclosure law should pay
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disabled, illiterate, elderly, or extraordinarily mentally deficient in some way. In other
words, our goal was to identify contracting parties who even the most conservative courts
might readily consider easy targets in need of protection from unscrupulous predators.
Accordingly, we predicted that courts are significantly more likely to impose a duty to
disclose when the uninformed party is sick, disabled, elderly, or illiterate. .
E. Behavior of the Informed Party
Just as the characteristics of the uninformed party might impact court rulings, the
informed party’s behavior might influence court decisions regarding the need for
disclosure in any given transaction. Specifically, when the informed party has “behaved
badly,” courts might be more likely to punish or discourage such behavior through the
imposition of disclosure duties that deprive the informed party of the opportunity to
legally profit from her secret information. Accordingly, we examined two types of bad
behavior by the informed party: affirmative misrepresentations or half-truths that
accompany the undisclosed information, and active concealment of the undisclosed
information.
1. The informed party made affirmative misrepresentations or half-truths
Often fraudulent silence claims form one part of a larger claim in which other
wrongs are alleged, such as affirmative misrepresentations or half-truths. Although
technically courts should rule on each count of the complaint separately and a finding that
the informed party intentionally misrepresented one fact should not impact the court’s
finding on liability for a different, undisclosed fact,93 we believe that courts are often
swayed by a general pattern of bad conduct on the part of the informed party.94

attention to the moral drama that occurs in bargaining and to the sources of individual negotiators'
grievances about exploitation, deception, and betrayal.”).
93
Unless, of course, the informed party’s lies somehow prevented the uninformed party from learning the
truth.
94
Wilson , supra note 14 at 234 (stating that, “’[I]f a single word be dropped which tends to mislead the
vendor’ it will vitiate the contract. Thus it is, that in the mass of cases in which concealment or fraudulent
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Accordingly, we would expect to see disclosure required more often when the informed
party also made affirmative misrepresentations or half-truths, than when the informed
party was truly silent.
A half-truth is a statement that, although technically accurate, is nonetheless
misleading in some way.95 As stated in section 529 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
“[a] representation stating the truth so far as it goes but which the maker knows or
believes to be materially misleading because of his failure to state additional or
qualifying matter is a fraudulent misrepresentation.”96
Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that “[a] statement might
be true with respect to the facts stated, but might fail to include qualifying matter
necessary to prevent the implication of an assertion that is false with respect to other
facts.”97 To illustrate, the Restatement notes that a true statement that an event has
recently occurred might nonetheless mislead, if it creates the false impression that matters
have not changed subsequently.98
Donald Langevoort has correctly noted that there is no bright line between
affirmative misrepresentations and half-truths, or between half-truths and
nondisclosure.99 Instead, all three arise in transactional settings in which the parties
typically trade large amounts of information and, thus, represent a continuum, making
silence appears, there is also present this misrepresentation.”) (quoting Turner v. Harvey, 1 Jacob 178
(1821)).
95
See Langevoort, supra note 40 at 88-89 (discussing the half-truth); Goldfarb, supra note 87 at 24 (stating
that, [w]hile silence alone may not be actionable, if the vendor undertakes to speak, he must not conceal
anything which would tend to qualify or contradict the facts which he had stated. In other words, to tell
half of the truth is to make a half-false representation.”)
96
Rest. 2d Torts §529. The Restatement goes on to elaborate, “[t]hus, a statement that contains only
favorable matters and omits all reference to unfavorable matters is as much a false representation as if all
the facts stated were untrue.” Rest. 2d Torts §529, comment a. Although half-truths are actionable under
both tort and contract law, See Rest. 2d Torts §529, Rest. 2d Contracts §159, they form an especially
important part of securities litigation. See, Langevoort, supra note 40 at 90-91 (noting that half-truths are
actionable under sections 17(a)(2), 11, and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, and under Rule 10b-5
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.)
97
Rest. 2d Contracts §159, comment b.
98
Rest. 2d Contracts §159, comment b.
99
Langevoort, supra note 40 at 95-96.
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coding at the margins sometimes difficult.100 We predicted that courts are more likely to
impose a duty to disclose when the informed party lied or told a half-truth in the same
transaction in which she failed to disclose material information, than when the informed
party’s silence is unaccompanied by lies or half-truths.
2. The informed party actively concealed information
It frequently has been asserted that, if the informed party takes some affirmative
steps to prevent detection of the truth by the uninformed party, then disclosure is more
likely to be required. As stated by one commentator: “Concealment involves some
positive action on the part of one to prevent the other from ascertaining some material
fact, which without the interference he would probably have discovered.”101
For example, the seller of land might cover a landfill, ditch, or other defect on the
property with dirt and then fail to disclose this information to prospective purchasers.102
Similarly, if the uninformed party inquires about certain facts, the informed party might
lead him (through words or actions) in a direction where the facts cannot be found.103
We predicted that courts are more likely to require disclosure in such instances than in a
case where the seller had merely remained silent about some information, but took no
steps to prevent discovery by the purchaser.
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Id. at 96; Goldfarb, supra note 87 at 25 (noting that “a business transaction is never entirely without
conversation, and verbal exchanges nearly always involve, expressly or by implication, representations of
fact.”)
101
Wilson, supra note 14 at 233. See also, Goldfarb, supra note 87 at 10 (distinguishing between “active
concealment and mere nondisclosure”)
102
See, Merchant’s Bank v. Campbell, 75 Va. 455 (1881) (fraud found where defendants stopped up the
entrance to a valuable cavern and told plaintiffs that it was “nothing but a mud-hole.”); Schneider v. Heath,
3 Campb. 506 (1813) (opinion of Lord Mansfield, finding fraud where defendants had removed a ship from
the ways, where it had been sitting dry, and docked it in the water so that the plaintiffs could not observe
defects on the bottom of the boat).
103
See, e.g., Chrisholm v. Gadsden, 32 S.C.L. 220 (1847) (in response to uninformed party’s inquiries,
informed party sent him to inspect area of property where he knew the defect could not be discovered.);
Stewart v. Whyoming Ranch Co., 128 U.S. 383, 386 (1888) (fraud found where defendant prevented
plaintiff’s agent from making inquiries which would have revealed material negative information).
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F.

Case Date

One of the goals of this study was to identify any historical patterns in the data.
Specifically, the aim was to test the frequently repeated but never empirically tested
hypothesis that the doctrine of caveat emptor had faded in importance over time and that,
correspondingly, common law disclosure duties had increased during the time period of
our study (approximately 1789 to May 15, 2002).104 It has been asserted, in particular,
that the law governing latent defects became more pro-disclosure in recent years.105
The most commonly asserted rationale for this perceived trend is an economic
one: as America was transformed from an agrarian economy in which people typically
transacted primarily with persons whom they knew to a commercial economy in which
people regularly transacted with complete strangers, the law became more protective of
the rights of uninformed parties, in order to encourage commerce.106 In other words,
legal changes occurred in response to economic changes.
We thus predicted that the more recently a case was decided, the more likely a
court would be to find that the informed party owed the uninformed party a duty to
disclose. In addition, given Kronman’s claim regarding the trend over time for cases
involving latent defects, we predicted that, for cases in which the withheld information
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See, e.g., Keeton, supra note 22 at 31 (stating that, “[I]t is of course apparent that the content of the
maxim ‘caveat emptor’, used in its broader meaning of imposing risks on both parties to a transaction, has
been greatly limited since its origin.”); Kronman, supra note 1 at 24; Saul Levmore, Securities & Secrets:
Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 Va. L. Rev. 117, 133-34 (1982) (stating that, “[m]odern
cases, however, can be read as signaling a trend toward increased disclosure requirements.”) But see,
Dalley, supra note 2 at 441 (finding that the law of deceit did not become more protective of the rights of
uninformed parties from 1790-1860.); William B. Goldfarb, Fraud and Nondisclosure in the VendorPurchaser Relation, 8 Western Res. L. Rev. 5, 9 (1956) (stating that, [w]riters who believe that [caveat
emptor] has lost much of its content seem to be misreading the bulk of the decisions”).
105
Kronman, supra note 1 at 24 (arguing that, in “the last twenty-five years,” disclosure duties regarding
latent defects have increased dramatically).
106
Horwitz, supra note 14 at 198-201 (arguing that, as markets and commerce became depersonalized,
courts shifted their focus toward requiring disclosure of information not available to both parties, in
contrast to the either strict caveat emptor or the fair price doctrine that had preceded it). See also, J. Econ.
History (1996) (stating that, “the doctrine of caveat emptor for sales replaced the sound price rule (which
presumed that any item sold at full price was sound) by the early 1800’s and remained strong throughout
the early 20th century.”)
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related to a latent defect, courts would be more likely to find a duty to disclose during the
period 1958 through 1983, as compared to the years before 1958.
G. Court
1. Geographic Patterns
We also wanted to determine whether any geographical patterns emerged in the
cases. In particular, we wanted to test the assertion by some legal and economic
historians that southern states were historically much less likely to impose disclosure
duties on bargaining parties than were states in other regions.107
We predicted that courts in the south would be less likely to impose disclosure
duties as compared to other regions during two early periods: 1793-1860 and 18611940.108 In addition, we examined regional trends in a recent period: 1940-2002.
2. Differences Between Federal and State Courts
Although we are not aware of assertions by commentators of differences among
the cases according to jurisdiction, we wanted to test for such differences. In particular,
we were interested in whether state courts impose disclosure duties more frequently than
federal courts, and whether there are detectable differences among the federal circuits.
Because commentators have not asserted that such differences exist, we predicted no
significant influence of either the deciding court’s circuit or of whether the deciding court
was state or federal on the probability that a court would find a duty to disclose.
H. Summary of Hypotheses
Table 1 summarizes the hypotheses discussed throughout this section. In addition,
the table presents a summary of the basic results obtained from our regression analyses,
the details of which appear infra in Section IV.
107

See Dalley, supra note 2 at 431-32 (studying cases decided between 1790 and 1860 and claiming that
cases in the South resulted in more pro-seller decisions than other regions).
108
We chose these dates because they correspond roughly with the end of the Civil War and the beginning
of World War II, two events that were highly significant for the south.
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES AND BASIC REGRESSION RESULTS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG ODDS OF COURT FINDING A DUTY TO DISCLOSE
PREDICTED SIGN
OF COEFFICIENT

REGRESSION
RESULTS

+ / NO EFFECT
—
+
+
+
+

NO EFFECT
— / NO EFFECT
+
NO EFFECT
NO EFFECT
+

+
+
+
+
+
+

+
NO EFFECT
NO EFFECT
+
+ / NO EFFECT

NO EFFECT
+

+ / NO EFFECT
NO EFFECT

+
+
+

+
NO EFFECT
+

+
+
+

+
+
+

+

—

Decision made by state court

NO EFFECT

+ / NO EFFECT

Decision made by federal circuit court

NO EFFECT

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
Type of Information:
Information was intrinsic
Undisclosed information concerned personal intentions or opinions
Undisclosed information related to a latent defect
Information concerned a defect likely to cause bodily injury
Information concerned a defect likely to cause property damage
Information would have updated or corrected previously disclosed information
Type of Transaction:
Parties to transaction in a confidential or fiduciary relationship
Transaction concerned acquisition of insurance
Transaction concerned release from liability
Parties had unequal access to information
Transaction concerned the transfer of real property
Transaction concerned the transfer of a slave

Perfect predictor**

Type of Acquisition:
Information was casually acquired
Information was acquired through illegal or tortious means
Uninformed Party Characteristics:
Uninformed party was the buyer or lessee
Uninformed party was female
Uninformed party was sick, disabled, illiterate or elderly
Informed Party Characteristics:
Informed party made affirmative misrepresentations
Informed party concealed information
Informed party told a half-truth
Time Trends:
Year case was decided
Geographic Trends*:
3rd Cir: — / NO EFFECT
6th Cir: —
7th Cir: —

TABLE 1: This table provides a summary of the hypotheses derived from the literature regarding the factors influencing courts to find a duty
to disclose and results from basic regressions used to test these hypotheses. The results section also includes results of
hypotheses that are not tested using basic regressions. Note that the table reports the results from all specifications. Indeterminate
results indicate that the results are not robust to various specificiations.
* The predictions and results pertaining to the effects of the regional location of the court are provided in detail infra in Section IV.
** This variable is dropped from all regressions because, in each of the three cases involving slaves, the court found a duty to disclose.
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III.

DATA COLLECTION

A. The Collection Process
We ran our search on May 15, 2002, and retrieved cases in the “Allcases-old” and
“Allcases” databases on Westlaw.109 The search retrieved 217 cases in the Allcases-old
database, resulting in 152 observations.110 The search retrieved 1086 cases in the
Allcases database, from which a random sample resulting in 314 observations was drawn,
for a combined total of 466 observations. Courts found a duty to disclose in 51% of the
cases in our sample.111
1. The Search Terms
The search terms that we employed are: duty /3 disclos! /p fraud /p (contract tort) %
securities /3 act. The search was purposely designed to exclude cases that were decided
under the federal securities laws and, as a result, also excluded cases that might have
referenced the securities laws in reaching a decision. As a result, only one case involving
fraudulent silence in connection with the purchase or sale of a security was present in our
dataset.
2.Case Coding
Case coding was done by research assistants, with the supervision of one of the
authors.112 Steps were taken to enhance the consistency of coding by the different
research assistants. These steps include the adoption of bright-line rules, where

109

See the immediately following section for more detail regarding how the search for cases was
conducted.
110
Some cases are not usable, either because the court failed to reach a decision on the merits with respect
to the element of duty, because the search terms identified a case that does not actually address the question
being studied, or because the court’s decision did not reflect the common law because it was based on a
statute or was impacted by a warranty or waiver. As a result, the number of observations is less than the
number of cases retrieved. See infra notes 114-116 and accompanying text (further explaining this).
111
Although this statistic is consistent with the predictions of the Priest-Klein model, for reasons discussed
infra notes 179-184 and accompanying text, we believe this statistic is anomalous and unrelated to the
Priest-Klein model. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
of Legal Studies 1, 6 (1984).
112
Weekly meetings were held as a group in order to assess progress, discuss the cases, and answer
questions.
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possible,113 and several weeks of individually coding the same set of cases and discussing
them as a group. Once the group was able to consistently reach the same coding results,
coding on the project began. In addition, once the initial case coding was complete, all of
the coding was double-checked by a research assistant who had not been involved in the
initial coding project.
As previously noted, not all cases retrieved by the search terms were includable in the
study.114 For example, a small percentage of cases contained all of the specified search
terms, yet did not address the question being studied. In addition, we were unable to
code some cases, either because the court did not reach a decision on the merits of the
case, or because the opinion did not contain sufficient information to allow for complete
coding of all the independent variables.115 Finally, cases in which the common law had
been altered due to a waiver, warranty, or statute were excluded.116
Cases decided under a statute were especially problematic. Many states have
attempted to codify or expand the law governing fraudulent nondisclosure in particular
areas, especially real estate sales, consumer financing transactions, car sales, and health
care delivery. As a result, some cases in these areas (especially more recent cases) might
be decided under a statute. We did not automatically exclude such cases from our
dataset. Instead, when the statute (or, where relevant, the legislative history) simply
prohibited “fraud” without defining it (thus forcing courts to return to the common law
for a definition) or merely codified the common law, we coded the case as if it had been
113

These rules are discussed in connection with the individual variables in Part II of this Article.
See supra note 110 (discussing the difference between the number of cases retrieved and the number of
usable cases).
115
When the case included in our sample was an appeal from a lower court decision and that lower decision
was available on Westlaw, the research assistants sometimes referred to the lower court decision to attain
the complete facts necessary to code the case. In rare cases where a court did not reach a decision on the
merits of the case, the court nonetheless clearly indicated how it would have ruled if forced to decide the
case. Such cases were included in our dataset, despite the lack of a formal resolution to the dispute.
116
For example, a waiver might alter the common law by waiving the uninformed party’s rights to sue for
nondisclosure under common law. This would include items sold “as is.” Similarly, a warranty might
114
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decided under the common law. However, where the statute attempted to change or
expand the common law, or where the statute specifically imposed liability for a failure
to disclose (as is typical, for example, in some statutes governing real estate sales), the
case was excluded.117
Finally, the research assistants checked all the cases in our dataset for negative direct
history. If a lower court fraudulent silence decision was reversed and remanded
specifically on the element of the existence of a duty to disclose, then the lower court
case was excluded from our dataset. The appellate decision also was excluded unless the
appellate court reached a decision on the merits of the duty element. If, however, a lower
court case was overturned for procedural reasons or on a point of law unrelated to the
duty to disclose issue, then the lower court case was included in our dataset, despite the
fact that the holding technically no longer stands.
B. The Available Cases
The Allcases-old database includes documents from the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, the U.S. District Courts, the former Circuit Courts, the former Court
of Claims, “related federal courts” (such as the tax and customs courts), and state and
local courts.118 The federal documents included in the database are those opinions
“released for publication” between 1789 and 1944.119 State and local coverage begins on
various dates and extends through 1944.120

enhance the uninformed party’s status under the common law, by guaranteeing the value or suitability of
the item in question.
117
A surprisingly large number of such cases, especially cases concerning real estate sales, remain in our
dataset, however. This is because many state statutes imposing liability for a failure to disclose also permit
an informed waiver of the statute’s protection. In many of the real estate cases in our dataset, such a waiver
was procured, leaving the parties to rely on common law remedies.
118
See, Westlaw, Allcases-Old, Scope, p. 1.
119
Id. It is unclear from West’s website whether “released for publication” refers only to documents
officially released for publication or whether it also includes unpublished opinions that might have become
available. Neither West’s reference attorneys nor any other company representative was able to clarify this
point. Phone interview with West reference attorney, August 4, 2002. Because the practice (at least within
the federal appellate courts) of disposing of cases through unpublished opinions is assumed by most
commentators to have begun in 1964, however, the issue of unpublished opinions is likely to be a greater
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The Allcases database includes decisions dated after 1944 from the United States
Supreme Court, the United States Courts of Appeals, the United States District Courts,
the Bankruptcy Courts, the Court of Federal Claims, the U.S. Tax Court, U.S. Military
Courts, and the state and local courts of all the states and the District of Columbia.121
The Allcases database includes published as well as unpublished opinions.122
Like many other studies attempting to empirically examine case law or judicial
developments, this study is limited to the Westlaw database, which does not include all
decided cases.123 Instead, Westlaw excludes some unpublished cases, thus biasing the
results to the extent that there is some systematic difference between available and
unavailable cases.124 For example, because the unpublished federal appellate decisions
seem more likely to be included on Lexis and Westlaw than are unpublished state court
decisions, if there is some systematic difference between federal appellate court decisions

problem in the Allcases database than in the Allcases-old database. See, infra note 128 and accompanying
text (discussing the origination of the federal appellate non-publication and no-citation policies.)
120
Westlaw, Allcases-Old, Scope, at 2-4.
121
See, Westlaw, Allcases Scope, p. 1.
122
Id. at 1. An “unpublished” opinion is one which the court has determined should be excluded from the
official reporter, ostensibly because the case contains no precedential value. Cf. Melissa M. Serfass &
Jessie L. Cranford, Federal and State Court Rules Governing Publication and Citation of Opinions, J. of
Appellate Practice and Process 251 (2001) (outlining the guidelines for opinion publication and citation in
each federal and state court of appeal).
123
A study seeking to examine the case law of a particular jurisdiction for a short (and relatively modern)
timeframe could examine all decided cases in some courts by attaining unpublished opinions either through
Westlaw or Lexis, the individual court’s website, the court clerk, or some other collection service. This
step is impractical in a study, such as ours, that attempts to analyze a sample of the entire set of federal and
state cases. Furthermore, as discussed infra notes 129-134 and accompanying text, early American cases
were often unreported, making any historical study of the common law incomplete.
124
According to a Westlaw representative, West gathers unpublished opinions for inclusion in the Allcases
database from three sources: (1) the Federal Appendix, a West publication; (2) opinions submitted to
Westlaw for posting in the database directly by the deciding court; and (3) opinions submitted to Westlaw
by attorneys. Phone interview with West reference attorney, Aug. 4, 2002.
The federal appendix does not contain all unpublished opinions. For example, the Third, Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits do not permit publication of their unpublished opinions in the Appendix. Brian P.
Brooks, Publishing Unpublished Opinions, 5 Greenbag 259, 260 (2002). In addition, the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits do not release their unpublished opinions for inclusion in the Westlaw or Lexis databases.
See, David Greenwald & Frederick A. O. Schwartz, The Censorial Judiciary, 35 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1133,
1174 n. 64 (2002).
Finally, West does not include in the Allcases database all unpublished opinions submitted for
inclusion by attorneys. Instead, West reviews the submitted cases and selects “some” for inclusion. No
Westlaw representative was able to provide further information on the selection process, what criteria were
used to determine inclusion, or indicate what percentage of cases submitted for inclusion by attorneys was
ultimately included in the database. Interview with West reference attorney, Aug. 4, 2002.
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and state court decisions, this differential inclusion in the Westlaw database could affect
the results of this or any other study relying on the Westlaw database. Similarly, because
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits do not release their unpublished opinions for inclusion on
Westlaw or Lexis, if there is some systematic difference between the Fifth and Eleventh
circuits on the one hand, and the other eleven circuits on the other hand, this difference
might bias the results of this and any other study that employs the Westlaw database.
Given that, in the federal appeals courts alone, over 80% of the caseload is disposed
of through unpublished opinions, this is a potentially glaring omission.125 As a matter of
black letter law, federal unpublished opinions have no precedential value.126 However,
many commentators have disputed the notion that unpublished opinions are really of no
consequence.127 Accordingly, readers should at least be aware of the potential limits of
this or any other study based on the on-line databases.
Although the problem of officially unpublished cases does not likely affect the
Allcases-old database – the practice is generally assumed to have begun with the 1964
Federal Judicial Conference128 – surveys of older American case law suffer from an even
greater problem: the lack of case reporting during the early years of American
independence. In the early years of the history of the American courts, lack of reporting
of decided cases was a serious problem.129 Lawyers had to make do with reports of
125

See, Table S-3, U.S. Courts of Appeals – Types of Orders Filed in Cases Terminated on the Merits after
Oral Hearings or Submission on Briefs During the 12-month period Ending September 30, 2001.
Available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2001/tables/s03sep01.pdf.
126
cite
127
See, Suzanne O. Snowden, "That’s My Holding and I’m Not Sticking to It!” Court Rules That Deprive
Unpublished Opinions of Precedential Authority Distort the Common Law, 79 Wash. U. L.Q. 1253
(2001) (arguing that unpublished opinions often would have had important future precedential value if
they had been published).
128
See, e.g., Greenwald & Schwartz, supra note 124 at 1141; Deborah J. Merritt & James J. Brudney,
Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 Vand. L. Rev.
71, 75-76 (2001).
129
See Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective on the Marshall
Court Ascendancy, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1291 (1985) (discussing the problem of nonreporting of cases in the
early years of the American court system). See also, 5 U.S. ( 1 Cranch) iii-v (1804) (stating that, “[m]uch
of that uncertainty of the law, which is so frequently, and perhaps so justly, the subject of complaint in this
country, may be attributed to the want of American reports.”) (quoted in Joyce, supra this note at 1308).
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English cases, which were still widely used even after American independence, and
notebooks of decisions that lawyers maintained for their own use and the use of their
colleagues and friends.130
Even opinions of the United States Supreme Court were difficult to come by in the
early years. The Court often failed to reduce even its most important decisions to
writing;131 the reporters did not include all decisions in their reports, perhaps excluding,
in some cases, as many as half;132 reports were often unavailable for periods of up to
eight years after the end of the Supreme Court term;133 and the reports of some reporters,
at least, were heavily criticized, even by their contemporaries and the justices themselves,
as being inaccurate.134 One can only assume that reports of state and lower federal cases
suffered from similar problems.
Readers should thus bear in mind that our only historical record of early court
decisions might be substantially inaccurate. Again, this is an unavoidable failing of all
studies of early case law, and we do not feel that it renders our results any less important
or robust.
Finally, as with all analyses of decided cases, this study does not account for the
impact of settlement on the type of case that ultimately proceeds to the litigation stage or

130

Joyce, supra note 129 at 1295, See also, Surrency, Law Reports in the United States, 25 Am J. Legal
Hist. 48, 49 (1981) (discussing the prevalence of English law reports in 18th century estates). [cite]
131
Joyce, supra note 129 at 1391, n. 46 and at n. 77 (quoting from a telephone conversation with Maeva
Marcus, Coeditor, Documentary History Project as stating that “[I]t seems odd that if opinions were written
not a single one in the hand of a justice survives. So it is likely that few, if any, ever existed.”)
132
Id. at 1303 (discussing the incompleteness of the reports of Alexander James Dallas, the Court’s first –
though unofficial – reporter) and at 1329-1330 (discussing the omission of cases by Henry Wheaton, the
Court’s third – and first official – reporter).
133
Id. at 1327-28 (noting that Cranch and Dallas had allowed Supreme Court cases to go unreported for 8
and 6 years, respectively). These delays were corrected by Wheaton, who generally published the reports
of the prior term in time for the start of the next. Id. at 1327-28.
134
Id. at 1304-1305 (discussing the inaccuracy of Dallas’s reports); 1309-10 (discussing inaccuracies in the
reports of Williams Cranch, the Court’s second – though unofficial – reporter); and at 1361 (discussing
criticisms of the reports of Richard Peters, Jr., the Court’s fourth reporter). The problem of inaccuracy
probably stemmed from many causes, including commercial considerations and the fact that some reporters
(notably, Dallas) included reports of cases that they did not have first hand knowledge of, but instead
reconstructed from notes of attorneys in attendance. Id. at 1305. One exception to these criticisms of
inaccuracy appears to be Wheaton, who apparently was “fanatical” on this point. Id. at 1329-30.
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the impact of judicial statements of case facts on our assumptions regarding what
occurred in any given transaction. As argued by some commentators, judges may
selectively repeat only the information that they consider relevant, or may allow their
own biases to shape their interpretation and description of the facts of the case.135 As
noted, however, this is typical of all legal analyses based on decided cases, including
traditional doctrinal legal scholarship.
C. Summary Statistics
Table 2 provides a short description of the variables related to case characteristics
and summary statistics for the entire sample, for the sub-sample of cases requiring
disclosure, and for the sub-sample of cases not requiring disclosure. Table 3 provides the
same information for variables related to decision date, geographic region, and
jurisdiction.

135

See, e.g., Anthony D’Amato, The Ultimate Injustice: When a Court Misstates the Facts 11 Cardozo L.
Rev. 1313, 1325-31 (1990) (arguing that Judge Easterbrook misstates the facts of the case in Branion v.
Gramly); Robert P. Burns, The Lawfulness of the American Trial, 38 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 205, 219 (2001)
(stating that “lawyers . . . often believe that the account of the facts provided by appellate courts is deeply
unfair”).
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TABLE 2
VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
CASE CHARACTERISTICS

VARIABLE

MEAN
FOR FULL
SAMPLE
(N = 466)

MEAN
FOR CASES
FINDING
DISCLOSURE
DUTY
(N = 237)

MEAN FOR
CASES
FINDING NO
DISCLOSURE
DUTY
(N = 229)

DEFINITION

Dependent Variable:
DISCL

0.51 (238)

1 = court imposed liability for fraudulent silence

Independent Variables:
Type of Information:
INSTRINSIC
PERSONAL
LATENT
INJURE
DAMAGE
UP_CORR

0.97
0.09
0.13
0.03
0.08
0.13

(452)
(42)
(60)
(12)
(36)
(62)

0.97
0.05
0.20
0.03
0.10
0.17

(230)
(12)
(48)
(8)
(23)
(41)

0.97
0.13
0.05
0.02
0.06
0.09

(222)
(30)
(12)
(4)
(13)
(21)

1 = information related to subject matter of transaction
1 = undisclosed information concerned personal intentions or opinions
1 = undisclosed information related to a latent defect
1 = information concerned a defect likely to cause bodily injury
1 = information concerned a defect likely to cause property damage
1 = information would have updated or corrected previously disclosed information

Type of Transaction:
CONFID
INSURE
RELEASE
ACCESS
PROPERTY
SLAVE

0.28
0.07
0.03
0.58
0.34
0.01

(131)
(32)
(15)
(268)
(157)
(3)

0.43
0.08
0.04
0.70
0.41
0.01

(102)
(20)
(9)
(165)
(96)
(3)

0.13
0.05
0.03
0.45
0.27
0.00

(29)
(12)
(6)
(103)
(61)
(0)

1 = parties to transaction in a confidential or fiduciary relationship
1 = transaction concerned acquisition of insurance
1 = transaction concerned release from liability
1 = parties had unequal access to information
1 = transaction concerned the transfer of real property
1 = transaction concerned the transfer of a slave

Type of Acquisition:
CASUAL
ILLEGAL

0.80 (371)
0.01 (4)

0.80 (190)
0.01 (3)

0.79 (181)
0.004 (1)

1 = information was casually acquired
1 = information was acquired through illegal or tortious means

Uninformed Party Characteristics:
BUYER
FEMALE
SICK

0.40 (186)
0.12 (55)
0.06 (27)

0.46 (109)
0.14 (33)
0.08 (19)

0.34 (77)
0.10 (22)
0.03 (8)

1 = uninformed party was the buyer or lessee
1 = uninformed party was female
1 = uninformed party was sick, disabled, illiterate or elderly

Informed Party Characteristics:
LIED
CONCEAL
HALF_TRUTH

0.20 (91)
0.08 (36)
0.23 (106)

0.35 (83)
0.14 (33)
0.37 (87)

0.03 (8)
0.01 (3)
0.08 (19)

1 = informed party made affirmative misrepresentations
1 = informed party concealed information
1 = informed party told a half-truth

TABLE 2: This table provides a summary of the variables representing case characterstics employed in the empirical analysis along with the mean and description of each variable. The entire sample
consists of 466 cases. The mean for each variable for the full sample can be interpreted as the percentage of cases characterized by the variable. For example, a mean of 51% for DISCLOSURE indicates
that 51% of the cases held the informed party liable. The numbers in the parentheses indicate the number of cases (i.e., mean times total number of cases in the sample).
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TABLE 3
VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
CASE DATE, GEOGRAPHIC REGION AND JURISDCTION

MEAN
FOR FULL
SAMPLE
(N = 466)

MEAN
FOR CASES
FINDING
DISCLOSURE
DUTY
(N = 237)

MEAN FOR
CASES
FINDING NO
DISCLOSURE
DUTY
(N = 229)

YEAR

1961

1949

1973

STATE

0.75

(348)

0.83

(197)

0.66

(151)

1 = case was decided by a state court

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS
CIR1
CIR2
CIR3
CIR4
CIR5
CIR6
CIR7
CIR8
CIR9
CIR10
CIR11
FEDCIR
DCCIR

0.02
0.05
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.002
0.01

(8)
(21)
(10)
(7)
(7)
(7)
(7)
(12)
(14)
(10)
(6)
(1)
(3)

0.01
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.004
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.00
0.004
0.01

(3)
(4)
(2)
(4)
(2)
(1)
(2)
(5)
(8)
(4)
(0)
(1)
(2)

0.02
0.07
0.03
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.000
0.004

(5)
(17)
(8)
(3)
(5)
(6)
(5)
(7)
(6)
(6)
(6)
(0)
(1)

1 = case was decided by the first circuit
1 = case was decided by the second circuit
1 = case was decided by the third circuit
1 = case was decided by the fourth circuit
1 = case was decided by the fifth circuit
1 = case was decided by the sixth circuit
1 = case was decided by the seventh circuit
1 = case was decided by the eighth circuit
1 = case was decided by the ninth circuit
1 = case was decided by the tenth circuit
1 = case was decided by the eleventh circuit
1 = case was decided by the federal circuit
1 = case was decided by the D.C. circuit

GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS
WEST
SOUTH
MIDATLANTIC
SOUTHWEST
NEWENGLAND
MIDWEST

0.14
0.25
0.23
0.08
0.07
0.24

(66)
(117)
(106)
(36)
(32)
(110)

0.16
0.23
0.24
0.08
0.06
0.22

(38)
(55)
(58)
(18)
(15)
(53)

0.12
0.27
0.21
0.08
0.07
0.25

(28)
(61)
(48)
(18)
(17)
(57)

1 = case was decided by a court located in the west
1 = case was decided by a court located in the south
1 = case was decided by a court located in a midatlantic state
1 = case was decided by a court located in the southwest
1 = case was decided by a court located in New England
1 = case was decided by a court located in the midwest

VARIABLE

DEFINITION

Additional Independent Variables:
year case was decided (range = [1793 , 2002])

TABLE 3: This table provides a summary of the variables representing case date, geographic region and jurisdiction employed in the empirical analysis along with the mean
and description of each variable. The entire sample consists of 466 cases. The numbers in the parentheses indicate the number of cases (i.e., mean times total number of
cases in the sample).
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IV.

RESULTS

The claims presented supra in Section II predict that the probability that a court
will find a duty to disclose depends, in part, on five groups of factors: the type of
information withheld by the informed party, the type of transaction in which the parties
engaged, the way in which the information was acquired by the informed party, the
characteristics of the uninformed party, and the behavior of the informed party. In
addition to these factors, we also investigate trends related to the decision date,
geographic location of the court, and jurisdiction.
Our dependent variable—DISCLOSURE—is dichotomous; therefore, linear
regression models such as Ordinary Least Squares (“OLS”) are not appropriate to
perform estimations.136 Instead, we employ logistic regressions to estimate the effects of
our independent variables on the predicted log odds that a court will require disclosure.137
Using regression analysis to measure the effects of the independent variables on the
predicted log odds that a court will require disclosure allows us to draw inferences about
which factors significantly influence court decisions when other factors are taken into
account.

136

A dichotomous variable is one that can take on only one of two possible values. The variable
DISCLOSURE is coded either as a “0” or a “1” for each observation in our sample.
137
The dependent variable is the predicted log odds that the event will occur rather than probability that the
event will occur because the log odds form satisfies the assumptions required to obtain valid regression
results. The coefficients generated when using this form as the dependent variable lack an intuitively
meaningful scale of interpretation. When interpreting the results in the text that follows, we interpret a
coefficient that is statistically significant and positive as indicating that the presence of the associated
independent variable leads to an increase in the likelihood that the court will require disclosure.
See Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise and Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the
Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 NYU L. Rev. 1377, 1431-32 n. 230 (1998)
(explaining the technical differences between OLS models and logit models). For an introduction to logistic
regression methodology, see generally Fred C. Pampel, Logistic Regression: A Primer (2000).
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Throughout this section, it is important to note that all reported results are
aggregate results and therefore do not reflect differences across jurisdictions. In other
words, a reported result that a particular variable (for example, PROPERTY) is
insignificant could mean that the variable is truly an insignificant predictor of case
outcomes in all jurisdictions. At the same time, it is possible that the variable’s effect on
decisions is significant and positive in the 1st circuit, canceling out the fact that it is
significant and negative in the 2nd Circuit. Similarly, a reported result that a particular
variable (for example, ACCESS) is positive and significant could mean that the variable
is a significant predictor of case outcomes in all jurisdictions or only a few. Indeed, it is
possible that the variable’s effect is negative and slightly significant in only one or a few
jurisdictions, but is counteracted by the variable’s highly significant positive impact in
other jurisdictions. In other words, this project is designed to study overall general trends
in decisions that correspond to claims made by legal scholars and economic historians
regarding general trends and patterns in the law governing fraudulent nondisclosure. We
do not attempt to describe the law for any particular jurisdiction.
Table 4 presents basic results for several logistic regression analyses that test the
influence of various sets of independent variables on the likelihood that a court will find
that the informed party owed a duty of disclosure to the uninformed party. 138 Various
specifications were analyzed to test the robustness of the results given the large number
of independent variables included in the model.139 The following sections provide a

138

We also analyzed the data using probit analysis and obtained results that were nearly identical to the
results we obtained using logistic regression analysis. For an explanation of how probit analysis differs
from logistic regression analysis, see Pampel, supra note 137 at 54-68.
139
By “specification” we mean the construction of the empirical equation that we estimate to generate
results regarding how the independent variables affect the dependent variable. The process of specifying
the model includes determining (1) which variables should be included in the model, (2) the functional
form of the model and (3) the probabilistic assumptions made about the dependent variable, the
independent variables and the error term. A result is “robust” if it does not vary significantly with the
specification of the model.
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TABLE 4
MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD LOGIT ESTIMATION RESULTS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PREDICTED LOG ODDS OF COURT FINDING A DUTY TO DISCLOSE
COEFFICIENT
(P VALUE)

VARIABLE
Type of Information:
INTRINSIC

0.32

0.16

(0.57)

(0.86)

PERSONAL

- 0.93**
(0.01)

(0.56)

LATENT

1.77***

2.24***

(0.00)

(0.00)

INJURE
DAMAGE
UP_CORR

- 0.32

0.07

1.05

(0.92)

(0.20)

- 0.63

- 0.23

(0.18)

(0.72)

0.90***

1.06**

(0.00)

(0.01)

Type of Transaction:
CONFID

1.82***

INSURE
RELEASE
ACCESS
PROPERTY

2.65***

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.14

- 0.13

(0.77)

(0.84)

0.53

0.51

(0.39)

(0.55)

1.19***

1.03***

(0.00)

(0.00)

1.27***

0.29

(0.00)

(0.45)

Type of Acquisition:
CASUAL
ILLEGAL

0.09

0.76*

(0.71)

(0.06)

1.10

1.26

(0.34)

(0.46)

Uninformed Party Characteristics:
BUYER
FEMALE
SICK

0.54**

1.18***

(0.01)

(0.00)

0.28

0.04

(0.36)

(0.93)

0.85*

1.58**

(0.06)

(0.03)

Informed Party Characteristics:
LIED

2.93***

3.17***

(0.00)

(0.00)

CONCEAL

2.82***

3.15***

(0.00)

(0.00)

HALF_TRUTH

2.18***

2.81***

(0.00)

(0.00)

Constant

-0.47
(0.40)

-1.60***
(0.00)

-0.04
(0.84)

-0.26**
(0.04)

-1.01***
(0.00)

-4.41***
(0.00)

LR Χ2

42.22
(0.00)

109.37
(0.00)

1.12
(0.57)

13.50
(0.00)

178.01
(0.00)

310.58
(0.00)

Pseudo R2
N

0.07
466

0.17
463

0.00
466

0.02
466

0.28
466

0.48
463

TABLE 4: This table provides the maximum-likelihood logit estimation results for the effects of case
characteristics on whether the court found a duty to disclose. These results do not include the
effects of the decision date or the geographic location and jurisdiction of the court. See Table 6 for results taking
these characteristics into account.
Note: LR Χ2 indicates the result from testing the null hypothesis that all coefficients in the model, except
the constant, equal zero. In addition, it should be noted that, although pseudo R2 statistics provide a quick way
to compare the fit of different models for the same dependent variable, they lack the straightforward
explained-variance interpretation of true R2 in OLS regressions.
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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variable-by-variable analysis of the results derived from the regression analysis and
various statistical tests.
A. The Type of Information
Recall that commentators have suggested that particular characteristics of the
withheld information influence courts’ decisions in fraudulent silence cases. These
characteristics include whether the information was intrinsic or extrinsic in nature, related
to personal intentions or opinions versus facts, related to latent or patent defects,
concerned a defect likely to cause bodily injury or property damage, and would have
updated or corrected previously disclosed information.
1. Whether the information was intrinsic, as opposed to extrinsic or market,
information does not explain the variation in outcomes because 97% of the cases in the
sample involve intrinsic information.
a. General Results
We hypothesized that cases involving intrinsic information are more likely to
result in a finding that the informed party owed a disclosure duty to the uniformed party
in early years, but that the importance of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction disappears over
time.140 As the results displayed in Table 4 indicate, the coefficient on INTRINSIC is
insignificant (p > 0.10), indicating that the intrinsic nature of the information is not a
factor that helps to explain the variation in case outcomes.141 It should be noted,
however, that this result is driven by the fact that 97% of the cases in the full sample
involve intrinsic, rather than extrinsic, information.
Nonetheless, other statistical tests allow us to cast some doubt on the conventional
wisdom regarding the relative likelihood that courts will require the disclosure of intrinsic
information. Specifically, tests for the equality of proportions cast doubt on claims that
140

See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text (discussing assertions by courts and commentators
regarding extrinsic information).
141
In other words, the coefficient on INTRINSIC is not statistically significantly different from zero.
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courts are more likely to require the disclosure of intrinsic information than extrinsic
information. Of the 14 cases in our data set involving extrinsic information, the court
found the existence of a duty to disclose in 8 of the cases (or 43%). On the other hand,
51% of the cases (or 231 of 452) involving intrinsic information resulted in a finding that
the informed party owed the uninformed party a duty to disclose. Our analysis thus
reveals that courts are not statistically more likely to require the disclosure of intrinsic
information as opposed to extrinsic information (p = 0.28).
Moreover, an interesting question here is why so few cases involving extrinsic
information result in judicial decisions. Apparently, cases involving extrinsic information
are more likely to settle, or are less likely to be brought by plaintiffs.
The first possibility is that cases involving extrinsic information are more likely to
settle. This might be true if, for example, courts are much more likely to rule in favor of
uninformed parties when the case involves extrinsic information. Informed parties,
knowing they have a low probability of winning in court, are encouraged to settle. We
find this theory unpersuasive, however, for two reasons. First, the notion that informed
parties have a lower probability of winning in court when the withheld information is
extrinsic in nature is contrary to conventional wisdom, which asserts that courts are less
likely to require the disclosure of extrinsic information than of intrinsic information. In
addition, this theory is contrary to the results in those extrinsic information cases that do
make it into court. As discussed supra, informed parties are no more likely to prevail in
cases involving extrinsic information than in cases involving intrinsic information.
Informed parties thus have no reason to fear outcomes in cases involving extrinsic
information more than in other types of fraudulent silence cases.
A second, and we believe more plausible, explanation for why so few extrinsic
information cases are found in our dataset is that plaintiffs are less likely to bring claims
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for fraudulent silence when the withheld information is extrinsic, rather than intrinsic.
There are at least three possible reasons for this phenomenon. First, it is possible that
individuals are less likely to possess extrinsic information unknown to their bargaining
partners as compared to intrinsic information. Second, if the common law clearly states
that informed parties are not required to disclose extrinsic information, rational plaintiffs
may choose to forgo litigating such cases. Again, however, the (limited) data do not
support this conjecture. Courts found a duty to disclose in about 43% of the cases in our
dataset involving extrinsic information. The third, and perhaps most plausible,
explanation for the small number of cases involving extrinsic information is that the
uninformed party is unlikely to discover that the informed party knew of extrinsic
information. For example, it is unlikely that a home buyer would discover that the seller
had access to nonpublic information regarding the fact that a highway was going to be
built across an adjacent lot. By contrast, the uninformed party may be able to easily
surmise that someone selling a car that she has owned for many years was aware that the
engine fails to start in cold weather.
b. Interaction Effects
Recall from Section II supra that commentators have asserted that some other
factor, rather than the intrinsic nature of the information, actually explains the variation in
fraudulent silence cases. For example, W. Page Keeton has argued that, although courts
require the disclosure of intrinsic information more frequently than extrinsic information,
it is really the lack of equal access to intrinsic information relative to extrinsic
information that is driving case outcomes.142 Similarly, Keeton argued that the
intrinsic/extrinsic distinction fails to explain case outcomes when the uninformed party is
the purchaser, as opposed to the seller. Finally, Anthony Kronman has asserted that it is

142

See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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really the fact that extrinsic information is typically deliberately acquired that drives case
outcomes, rather than the mere fact that the information is extrinsic.
To test these claims, we ran three separate regressions to determine if interaction
effects are present between INTRINSIC and the three variables ACCESS, CASUAL, and
BUYER.143 The results suggest that there are no significant interaction effects between
INTRINSIC and these three variables. This result, however, is most likely due to the lack
of variation in the INTRINSIC variable and the resulting collinearity144 between the
interaction term and the variables ACCESS, CASUAL, and BUYER.145
c. Time Trends
Recall that some commentators claim that courts, over time, put less weight on
whether the information was intrinsic or extrinsic, and instead focus on other factors.146
To test claims about the influence of intrinsic information over time, we tabulated the
number of cases that involved intrinsic information and in which the court found a duty
to disclose during three periods: 1793-1899, 1900-1949 and 1950-2002.147 Table 5
presents the results from this tabulation.
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By including interaction effects in the analysis, we are able to measure the amount of change in the
slope of the regression of the dependent variable, say Y, on an independent variable, say X, when a second
independent variable, say Z, changes by one unit. A positive and significant coefficient on an interaction
term, X * Z, implies that the higher is X, the greater the effect of Z on Y. Similarly, the higher is Z, the
greater the effect of X on Y.
144
Two variables are collinear if they are highly correlated. When two independent variables are highly
correlated, they both introduce essentially the same information into the regression. This violates one of the
necessary assumptions of the logit model. In addition, collinearity in this case implies that the interaction
term has very little variation and, therefore, is not likely to be a significant factor in explaining the variation
in outcomes.
145
We ran these regressions using only the 20 variables relating to case characteristics. We did not run the
complete specification due to the insignificant results from the initial regression.
146
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
147
These periods were chosen arbitrarily. The results do not vary if different periods are used to test the
hypothesis..
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TABLE 5
TABULATIONS FOR CASES INVOLVING
INTRINSIC INFORMATION

PERIOD
1793-1899
1900-1949
1950-2002

COURT FOUND
DUTY TO
DISCLOSE

COURT FOUND
NO DUTY TO
DISCLOSE

33 (77%)
72 (70%)
126 (41%)

10 (23%)
31 (30%)
180 (59%)

TABLE 5: This table presents the results of tabulations of the
number of cases involving intrinsic information by outcome
for three periods: 1793-1899, 1900-1949 and 1950-2002.

Tests for the equality of proportions were performed to investigate the claim that
over time courts place less emphasis on whether the information was intrinsic or
extrinsic.148 First, we tested whether courts impose disclosure duties in a statistically
significantly lower proportion of cases involving intrinsic information during the period
1793-1899 than in the period 1900-1949. The result indicates that no statistically
significant difference exists between the percentages (p = 0.20).149 On the other hand, the
proportion of cases involving intrinsic information in which the court found a duty to
disclose during the period 1900-1949 was statistically significantly higher than the
proportion of such cases during the period 1950-2002 (p = 0.00). Therefore, the data do
show some support for the claim that factors other than whether the information was
intrinsic or extrinsic became more important to courts over time. This alone, however,
148

In particular, we ran two-sample, one-sided tests on the equality of proportions (calculated using the
data from two distinct samples). These tests pit the null hypothesis of equal proportions against an
alternative hypothesis that one proportion is statistically significantly greater than the other, controlling for
sample size. If the null hypothesis is accepted over the alternative hypothesis, then one may conclude that
the difference in proportions is due to chance.
149
The p value of a hypothesis test is the probability, calculated assuming the null hypothesis is true (e.g.,
the proportions are equal), of observing any outcome as extreme or more extreme than the observed
outcome. “Extreme” means in the direction of the alternative hypothesis. In this case, there is a 20% chance
of observing these proportions given that they are equal to one another. This is fairly high; so, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that the proportions are equal. Customarily, in social science research, a null
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does not allow us to determine whether this trend is due to the relative emphasis courts
place on whether the information is intrinsic or the general decrease over time in the
likelihood that courts will find the existence of a duty to disclose.150
d. Section Summary
In sum, although the lack of variation in the INTRINSIC variable did not allow
the use of regression analysis to determine the variable’s impact, if any, on case
outcomes, several lessons emerge from this exercise. First, claims by commentators as to
the impact of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction on case outcomes should be viewed with
caution. The same lack of variation that confounds our attempts at regression analysis
makes drawing inferences about the variable’s impact on case outcomes from reading a
select number of non-randomly chosen cases problematic. Second, tests for the equality
of proportions cast doubt on claims that courts are more likely to require the disclosure of
intrinsic information than extrinsic information.
2. Whether the information involves personal intentions or opinions, as opposed
to facts, does not explain the variation in case outcomes because the number of cases
involving such information is too small to obtain useful results from regression analysis.
Outcome counts, however, cast doubt on the conventional wisdom relating to personal
intentions.
Recall that there is almost universal agreement among commentators that the
disclosure of personal intentions or opinions is not required by the common law.151 The
results presented in Table 4 indicate that the coefficient on PERSONAL is significant and

hypothesis is rejected in favor of an alternative hypothesis if the p value is less than 5% (in some cases, a
10% cutoff is used). In all cases, we report the exact p values derived from the statistical tests.
150
In theory, it is possible to control for the general trend over time and other influences on court decisions,
by estimating the influence of intrinsic information over time using a logistic regression that includes the
20 variables representing case characteristics and YEAR, together with a term to capture the interaction of
year and intrinsic information (INTRINSIC * YEAR). The coefficient on the interaction term would allow
us to determine whether courts were more or less likely to require disclosure in cases involving intrinsic
information in later years relative to earlier years. The coefficient on the interaction term was not
statistically significantly different from zero (p = 0.67). However, due to the lack of variation in the
INSTRINSIC variable, this regression result does not provide us with any useful information. See supra
notes 140-141 and accompanying text (discussing problems arising from the fact that 97% of the cases
involve intrinsic information.)
151
See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
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negative (p = 0.01) when we control only for variables relating to the type of information.
When we control for all case characteristics, however, the coefficient loses significance.
When all variables are included in the model the coefficient on PERSONAL is
insignificant (p > 0.10), indicating that whether the information is a personal opinion or
intention versus a fact is not a factor that helps to explain the variation in case outcomes.
It should be noted, however, that this result most likely is driven by the fact that only 9%
of the cases in the full sample involve personal intentions or opinions. The number of
these sorts of cases might be too small to accurately identify the effect of this variable on
the likelihood of mandated disclosure.
Nonetheless, simple outcome counts cast doubt on the conventional wisdom
relating to the disclosure of personal intentions or opinions. Recall that consensus on the
theory that the common law does not require the disclosure of personal intentions or
opinions is so widespread that we hypothesized, first, that very few such cases are
actually brought and, second, that when such cases do result in a decision the court nearly
always permits such information to be withheld. The results of the outcome count do not
support either prediction regarding personal intentions or opinions.152 Of the 466 cases in
the sample, 41 (or 9%) involve information that was personal in nature.153 In a
substantial portion of these cases (12 of the 41), the court ruled that the informed party
had a duty to disclose the withheld opinion or intention.
3. Courts are significantly more likely to require disclosure when the withheld
information relates to a latent defect.
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It is important to note that simple counts do not control for the effects of other variables of interest.
Results obtained from simple counts must be viewed with this limitation in mind.
153
We can rule out the fact that the lack of cases is attributable to courts’ reluctance to impose liability for
failure to disclose personal intentions or opinions in early cases, causing plaintiffs to eventually abandon
such claims. Cases involving personal intentions or opinions appeared in the data set uniformly over time.
The first case of this sort was decided in 1852, five others were decided prior to 1950, and the remaining
cases were decided after 1950.
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We hypothesized that courts would be more likely to require disclosure when the
informed party withholds information relating to a latent defect. The results presented in
Table 4 support this claim. The coefficient on LATENT is positive and highly significant
(p = 0.00), even when we control for all variables relating to case characteristics. In this
case it appears that the commentators have correctly argued that this factor significantly
influences courts’ decisions in fraudulent silence cases.
4. Whether the undisclosed information would likely cause bodily injury or
property damage does not explain the variation in the case outcomes, most likely because
the number of cases involving such information is too small to obtain useful results from
regression analysis. Outcome counts, however, suggest that our hypotheses regarding
information of this sort are not supported strongly by the data.
We hypothesized that the withholding of information likely to cause physical
injury or property damage increases the likelihood of court-mandated disclosure. We
coded cases separately for information concerning a defect likely to cause bodily injury
(INJURE) and information concerning a defect likely to cause property damage
(DAMAGE). The results presented in Table 4 indicate that the coefficients on INJURE
and DAMAGE are insignificant (p > 0.10 in all cases). We note, however, that very few
cases involving information of this sort were present in our dataset. Only 3% of the cases
included in the full sample involve information likely to cause bodily injury and 8% of
the cases involve information likely to lead to property damage. Therefore, the number of
these sorts of cases might be too small to accurately identify the effect of these variables
on the likelihood of mandated disclosure.
Again we performed simple counts, the results of which shed light on whether
courts are more likely to require disclosure of information regarding defects likely to
cause physical injury or property damage. The results do not support our hypothesis that
courts are more likely to require disclosure of this sort of information. Of the 12 cases
involving information likely to result in physical injury, 8 (or 67%) resulted in a finding
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that the informed party had a duty to disclose. Likewise, in 64% of cases (or 23 of 36)
involving information likely to result in property damage, the court found a duty to
disclose. Therefore, while courts tend to rule for the uninformed party slightly more often
when bodily injury or property damage is at stake (courts require disclosure in about 50%
of cases not involving such information), these case outcomes are not nearly as uniform
as one might expect, given the statements of legal commentators.
As with the INTRINSIC variable, an interesting question here is why there are so
few decisions involving information that could prevent bodily injury or property
damage.154 One possibility is that these cases settle, because the plaintiff (who, by
definition, has suffered bodily injury or property damage) seems sympathetic and the
defendant’s behavior appears more egregious in comparison. In addition, it might be that
cases of this sort give rise to other claims, such as negligence, and lawyers representing
injured parties simply might not include additional claims for fraudulent silence. Finally,
it is possible that failures to disclose information regarding defects likely to lead to
injuries or property damage simply occur with lower frequency than nondisclosures of
other types of information. Obviously, we cannot test this conjecture using our data.
5. Courts are significantly more likely to require disclosure when the withheld
information would have updated or corrected previously disclosed information.
We hypothesized that courts would be more likely to require disclosure when the
undisclosed information would have updated or corrected previously disclosed
information. The results presented in Table 4 support this claim. The coefficient on
UP_CORR is positive and highly significant (p = 0.01) when we control for all variables
relating to case characteristics. In this case it appears that the commentators have
correctly argued that this factor significantly influences courts’ decisions in fraudulent
silence cases.
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B. The Type of Transaction
Recall that commentators have argued that the type of transaction in question
influences courts’ decisions in fraudulent silence cases. In particular, claims have been
made that courts are more likely to require disclosure in transactions between parties in a
confidential or fiduciary relationship; transactions concerning the acquisition of
insurance, surety, or a release from liability; transactions in which the parties have
unequal access to information; transactions concerning the transfer of real property; and
transactions concerning the sale or transfer of a slave.155
1. Courts are significantly more likely to require disclosure when the contracting
parties are in a confidential or fiduciary relationship.
We hypothesized that courts would be more likely to require disclosure when the
contracting parties are in a confidential or fiduciary relationship. The results presented in
Table 4 support this claim. The coefficient on CONFID is positive and highly significant
(p = 0.00), even when we control for all variables relating to case characteristics. In this
case it appears that the commentators have correctly argued that, when the parties are in a
confidential or fiduciary relationship, courts are more likely to require disclosure.
2. Whether the transaction concerned insurance or a release from liability does
not explain the variation in case outcomes, most likely because the number of cases
involving such a transaction is too small to obtain useful results from regression analysis.
Outcome counts, however, suggest that our hypotheses regarding information of this sort
are not supported strongly by the data.
We hypothesized that decisions involving transactions related to insurance,
surety, or a release from liability were more likely to result in the imposition of liability
for nondisclosure of information. We coded INSURANCE and RELEASE separately.
However, only one case in our sample involved surety. Therefore, we coded the single
surety case as an insurance case. The independent variable INSURE thus represents cases
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See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 43-70 and accompanying text.
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related to insurance and one case related to surety. RELEASE represents cases related to
releases from liability.
The results presented in Table 4 indicate that the coefficients on INSURE and
RELEASE are insignificant (p > 0.10 in all cases). We note again, however, that there are
very few decisions involving information of this sort. Only 7% of the cases included in
the full sample involve insurance transactions and only 3% of the cases involve releases
from liability. Therefore, the number of these sorts of cases might be too small to
accurately identify the effect of these variables on the likelihood of mandated disclosure.
Again, we used simple outcome counts to determine whether courts are more
likely to require disclosure of information when the transaction involves insurance or a
release from liability. The results do not support our hypothesis that courts are more
likely to require disclosure of this sort of information. Of the 32 cases involving
insurance contracts, the court found a duty to disclose in 20 (or 63%). Likewise, courts
found a duty to disclose in 60% of cases (or 9 of 15) involving releases from liability.
Therefore, while courts tend to find a duty to disclose in a somewhat slight majority of
cases involving insurance or releases from liability, courts do not force disclosure in an
overwhelming number of such cases.
3. Courts are significantly more likely to require disclosure when the transaction
was one in which the parties had unequal access to information. However, our analysis
indicates that the presence of unequal access in combination with the casual acquisition
of information is the actual driver of case outcomes.
Recall from Section II that one of the liveliest debates in this literature is whether
unequal access to information has a significant influence on the probability that courts
will require the disclosure of material information. Of particular interest has been the
debate between proponents of the equal access theory and proponents of the deliberately
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acquired information theory.156 The results reveal that if the parties had unequal access
to the undisclosed information, courts are more likely to find that the informed party had
a duty to disclose. The coefficient on ACCESS is positive and highly significant (p =
0.00), even when we control for all variables relating to case characteristics.
To ensure fair testing of the equal access theory we ran two additional
regressions. First, Scheppele’s assertions about the state of the law were published in
1988. Accordingly, if changes in the law caused courts to decide fraudulent silence cases
differently after 1988, a regression on our full dataset might fail to support the equal
access theory, even if Scheppele’s assertions were correct when made. To test this
possibility, we ran a second regression using only cases decided from 1793 to 1987.
Under this specification, the coefficient on ACCESS remains positive and highly
significant (p = 0.008; n = 264)
Second, it is possible that Scheppele was actually reporting a perceived trend in
the law based on a reading of several recent, important cases that she believed signaled a
development in existing law. If this is the case, then a regression on cases decided up to
the date of her statements would not pick up that trend, as the small number of recent,
important cases would be outweighed by the larger number of older cases decided under
the prior rule of law. To test this possibility we ran a third regression using only cases
decided from 1989 to 2002. Under this specification, the coefficient on ACCESS is
insignificant (p = 0.17; n = 190), indicating that, in later cases, unequal access to
information is not a driving force behind decisions on the duty element. Therefore, our
data do not support the claim that Scheppele was reporting a perceived trend or change in
the law.
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Compare Scheppele, supra note 2 (arguing that outcomes in fraudulent silence cases are best explained
by the equal access theory) with Kronman, supra note 1 (arguing that outcomes in fraudulent silence cases
are best explained by the fact that some information is casually acquired and some information is
deliberately acquired).
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Our results thus shed light on this long-standing debate and, at least initially, lend
some support to the proponents of the equal access theory. Particularly when viewed in
light of the results on cases involving casually acquired information,157 our analysis
seems to support the equal access proponents as opposed to those who claim that judges
primarily consider economic efficiency in deciding case outcomes.
Because Scheppele relied on many of the same cases employed by Kronman to
develop her theory, we thought it probable that both unequal access and casually acquired
information were present in those cases requiring disclosure that the two authors
examined. In other words, we surmised that both Kronman and Scheppele may have
looked at a particular set of cases in which disclosure was required, the information was
casually acquired, and the parties had unequal access. However, whereas Kronman
concluded that the casually acquired nature of the information drove case outcomes,
Scheppele concluded that it was the unequal access of the parties that affected case
outcomes. In contrast, we hypothesized that perhaps it is the presence of unequal access
and casually acquired information together, rather than either factor separately, that
actually drives case outcomes.
To test this claim, we used a logistic regression and included all 20 variables
representing case characteristics and an interaction term, CASUAL * ACCESS.158 When
we include this interaction term, we find that the coefficient on the interaction term is
statistically significant and positive (p = 0.04). At the same time, the coefficients on
CASUAL and ACCESS both become insignificant (p = 0.86 and p = 0.72, respectively).
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See infra Section IV.C.
The variable ACCESS and the interaction term (CASUAL * ACCESS) are strongly positively correlated
(r = 0.80). Therefore, we checked for problems related to multicollinearity. When we regress ACCESS on
all the other independent variables and CASUAL * ACCESS, the tolerance is equal to 0.19. This means
that 19% of the variation in the ACCESS variable is not explained by the other independent variables. We
get a similar measure of tolerance when we regress the interaction term on all the independent variables.
Tolerances of 5% or less are cause for concern. Thus, we are confident that our results are not significantly
affected by multicollinearity.
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These results suggest that courts are more likely to find a duty to disclose when
both of these factors are present, but not when either is present alone. Accordingly, our
analysis indicates that each side of this heated debate is both right and wrong at the same
time. Although whether or not the parties to the transaction had equal access to
information and whether the informed party casually acquired the information both
impact the probability that a court will mandate disclosure, as suggested by participants
in the debate, it is only the presence of both factors together that significantly impacts
case outcomes.
4. Whether the transaction involved the transfer of real property does not explain
the variation in case outcomes when we control for all case characteristics.
As we discussed in Section II, some commentators claim that courts are more
likely to require disclosure when the contract involves the transfer of real property.159
The results presented in Table 4 indicate that the coefficient on PROPERTY is highly
significant and positive (p = 0.00) when we control only for variables relating to the type
of transaction. When we control for all case characteristics, however, the coefficient loses
significance. When all variables related to case characteristics are included in the model
the coefficient on PROPERTY becomes insignificant (p > 0.10), indicating that courts’
decisions in cases involving the transfer of real property are actually driven by other
variables that are present in these sorts of cases.160
5. Three cases involving the sale or transfer of a slave appear in the dataset, and
in each case the court found that the informed party had a duty to disclose. We were
forced to drop the variable SLAVE from the regression analysis because it is a perfect
predictor of case outcome.
Although we predicted in Section II that courts are more likely to impose
disclosure duties in cases involving the sale or transfer of a slave, we were not able to test
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See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
To test the most obvious potential variables driving the real property cases, we ran two logistic
regressions that included all 20 variables related to case characteristics and an interaction term for either
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this claim using regression analysis to control for the effects of other case characteristics
because SLAVE is a perfect predictor of whether the court required disclosure. In all
three cases involving the sale or transfer of a slave, the court held that the informed party
had a duty to disclose. Therefore, although only three cases in our sample involve the sale
or transfer of a slave, the fact that all three require disclosure is at least consistent with
claims by some commentators that courts vigilantly police such transactions.
C. How the Information Was Acquired
As discussed in Section II, commentators also have argued that the method the
informed party used to acquire the undisclosed information influences the likelihood that
courts will impose a duty to disclose on parties to a transaction. In particular,
commentators have argued that courts more frequently require the disclosure of casually
acquired information and information acquired through illegal or tortious means.
1. The results provide very weak support, if any, for the claim that courts are
more likely to require the disclosure of casually, as opposed to deliberately, acquired
information. However, our analysis indicates that, if the parties lacked equal access to
the information and the information was acquired casually, courts are more likely to
require disclosure.161
a. General Results
Recall from Section II that Kronman contends that courts hesitate to require the
disclosure of information deliberately acquired by the informed party.162 We suggest,
however, that because distinguishing between deliberately acquired and casually acquired
information is difficult in practice, this factor has not strongly influenced decisions by
courts in fraudulent silence cases.

PROPERTY * LATENT or PROPERTY * BUYER. In both cases, the interaction term was insignificant,
meaning that neither LATENT nor BUYER drives the outcomes in property cases.
161
See supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text (discussing the interaction of ACCESS with CASUAL).
162
See supra notes __ and accompanying text (discussing the Kronman theory). As previously noted,
Kronman limits his claims to socially productive information, a distinction that we find irrelevant for the
purposes of this study. See supra note __ (discussing this fact).
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The results presented in Table 4 are mixed on this factor. When we control only
for factors relating to how the information was acquired, the coefficient on CASUAL is
insignificant (p = 0.71). When we control for all case characteristics, however, the
coefficient becomes positive and weakly significant (p = 0.06), suggesting that courts
might be more likely to require disclosure when the information is casually acquired as
opposed to deliberately acquired.
It is important to note here that the result related to this variable is not robust to
other specifications that include variables for the year in which the case was decided, the
geographic region in which the court sits, and the jurisdiction of the court.163 As
presented in Table 6, when we control for the case characteristics and (1) the decision
year, or (2) the geographic region, or (3) whether the court is a state or federal court, the
coefficient on CASUAL remains positive and weakly significant (0.10 > p > 0.05). On
the other hand, when we control for (1) the case characteristics together with the circuit in
which the court sits, or (2) all independent variables that we coded, the coefficient on
CASUAL becomes insignificant (p > 0.10).
To ensure a fair test of Kronman’s claims, we ran two additional regressions.
First, Kronman developed his theory based on an examination of the law in 1978. As a
result, if a change in the law of fraudulent silence caused courts to decide cases
differently after 1978, then a regression on the full dataset could unfairly reject
Kronman’s hypothesis. Accordingly, we ran a second regression using only cases
decided from 1793 to 1977. In this specification, which controls only for the case
characteristics and not year of decision, jurisdiction, or geographic region, the coefficient
on CASUAL remains positive and weakly significant (p = 0.08; n = 204).
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General results for specifications including these additional variables are presented infra in Sections
IV.F and IV.G.
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Second, Kronman may actually have been reporting a perceived trend or change
in the law based on the outcomes of a few recently decided, important cases that he
believed signaled a change in existing law. If this is true, then a regression on cases
decided up to the time Kronman made his statements would not pick up this trend,
because the many older cases following the prior rule of law would obscure the impact of
the more recent, important cases asserting a new rule of law. To test this possibility, we
ran a regression using only cases decided from 1979 to 2002. In this specification, again
controlling only for case characteristics, the coefficient on CASUAL becomes
insignificant (p = 0.22; n = 255), indicating that whether the information was casually,
rather than deliberately, acquired has no significant influence on whether the court finds a
duty to disclose in the later cases. Therefore, our data do not support the claim that
Kronman was reporting a perceived trend or change in the law.
b. Assumptions Regarding the Means of Information Acquisition
Recall that Kronman contends that, because it is inefficient for courts to make
case-by-case determinations of whether information is casually or deliberately acquired,
courts instead lay down blanket rules about what class of case is most likely to involve
deliberately or causally acquired information. In contrast, we coded cases on an
individual basis, by analyzing the specific facts of each case. Accordingly, our study was
not designed to test precisely the Kronman hypothesis.
Nonetheless, coding in this manner allows us to test whether or not Kronman was
correct in his assumptions about how certain types of information are normally acquired.
Recall for example that Kronman asserts that whether or not information is extrinsic or
intrinsic appears to be relevant to court decisions only because extrinsic information is
typically deliberately acquired, and courts are concerned with protecting parties who have
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deliberately acquired their information.164 To test the claim that extrinsic information is
typically deliberately acquired we performed simple counts. Of the 14 cases in our data
set that involve extrinsic information, eight (or 57%) involve information that was
causally acquired. This result does not lend much support to Kronman’s characterization
of the typical method of acquiring extrinsic information.
Similarly, Kronman asserts that whether or not the transaction concerned the
transfer of real property appears to be relevant to courts only because information
relevant to the transfer of real property is typically casually acquired, and courts are more
likely to require the disclosure of casually acquired information. To test the claim that
information relevant to the transfer of real property is typically casually acquired, we
performed simple counts. Of the 157 cases in our data set that involve information
concerning the transfer of real property, 124 (or 79%) involve casually acquired
information. In this instance, at least, Kronman’s hypothesis about the manner of
information acquisition appears largely correct.
Finally, Kronman argues that whether or not a defect is latent or patent appears to
drive case outcomes only because information concerning a latent defect is typically
casually acquired, and courts require the disclosure of casually acquired information. To
test the claim that information concerning a latent defect is typically casually acquired we
preformed simple counts. Of the 60 cases in our data set that involve information
concerning a latent defect, 54 (or 90%) involved casually acquired information. In this
instance, again, Kronman’s prediction about the method by which such information is
acquired seems accurate.
Of course these results do not take into account cases that are not ultimately
decided by the court, and there is reason to believe that claims that settle or are never

164

See supra Section II.
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filed are different in important ways from claims that result in decisions. Without access
to this information, we are not able to adequately evaluate Kronman’s claims about the
likely means of information acquisition in all cases.
c. Section Summary
In sum, although some of Kronman’s theories about the typical method of
information acquisition are supported by the data, his theories are ultimately based on an
assumption that case outcomes depend on whether the information was casually or
deliberately acquired. Although the coefficient on CASUAL is weakly significant in
some specifications, the p value is never below 5% and in many specifications, including
the full specification, the coefficient is insignificant. Given these results, conjectures as
to the interaction of the CASUAL variable with other variables (such as whether the
information was extrinsic, whether it related to the transfer of real property, and whether
it related to a latent defect) are misplaced. We do find, however, that, if the information
was acquired casually and the parties lacked equal access to the information, courts are
more likely to require disclosure.165
2. Whether the information was acquired through illegal or tortious means does
not explain the variation in case outcomes because the number of cases involving such
information is too small to obtain useful results from regression analysis. Outcome
counts provide limited support for the hypothesis that courts are more likely to impose
disclosure duties on contracting parties when the information is acquired through illegal
or tortious means.
We hypothesized that if the informed party acquires information using illegal or
tortious means courts are more likely to hold that the informed party owed the
uninformed party a duty to disclose. The results presented in Table 4 demonstrate that the
coefficient on ILLEGAL is insignificant (p > 0.10), indicating that this factor does not
help to explain the variation in case outcomes. It should be noted, however, that this
result most likely is driven by the fact that only 1% of the cases in the full sample involve
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information of this sort. The number of these sorts of cases might be too small to
accurately identify the effect of this variable on the likelihood of mandated disclosure.
Nonetheless, simple outcome counts provide some support for our hypothesis
relating to the disclosure of illegally acquired information. Of the four cases in the
sample involving information acquired illegally or tortiously, three cases (or 75%)
resulted in the imposition of liability for fraudulent silence. The results of the outcome
count thus provide some support for the claim that courts are more likely to impose a
duty to disclose on the informed party when the withheld information is acquired
illegally or tortiously, although the support is weak given that our sample includes a very
small number of such cases.
As with cases involving extrinsic information, information likely to cause bodily
injury or property damage, information relating to personal intentions or opinions,
information relating to the acquisition of insurance or a release from liability, and
information relating to the sale of a slave, a relevant question is why so few cases
involving information acquired by illegal or tortious means result in decisions. One
possibility is that such cases settle early because the defendant is unsympathetic (having
violated the law or committed a tort). Accordingly, such defendants might fear that
courts will treat them more harshly, and would prefer to avoid the costs and potential bad
publicity associated with litigation. If true, this fear regarding the impact of the informed
party’s behavior on the case outcome is consistent with our findings regarding court
decisions when the informed party has engaged in other types of bad behavior, such as
concealing information, lying, or telling a half-truth.166

165
166

See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
See infra section IV.E. (discussing the impact of the informed party’s behavior on case outcomes).
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D. Characteristics of the Uninformed Party
As discussed in Section II, we hypothesized that court decisions are influenced by
particular characteristics of the uninformed party, including whether the uninformed
party is a buyer or lessee, is female, or is sick, disabled, illiterate, elderly, or otherwise
severely disadvantaged in the bargaining relationship, although still competent to
contract.
1. Courts are significantly more likely to require disclosure when the uninformed
party is a buyer or lessee.
We hypothesized that courts would be more likely to require disclosure when the
uninformed party is the buyer or lessee, as opposed to the seller. The results presented in
Table 4 support this claim. The coefficient on BUYER is positive and highly significant
(p ≤ 0.01), even when we control for all variables relating to case characteristics. In this
case, it appears that the commentators have correctly argued that courts impose higher
disclosure duties on sellers than on purchasers.
2. Whether the uninformed party was female does not seem to be a factor that
influences courts’ decisions regarding fraudulent silence. However, the percentage of
cases in which the uninformed party is female and disclosure is required decreased
significantly from the period 1793-1950 to the period 1951-2002167.
As discussed in Section II, we hypothesized that a duty to disclose information is
more likely to be found when the uninformed party is female, especially in older cases.
The results presented in Table 4, however, indicate that the coefficient on FEMALE is
insignificant (p > 0.10) in all specifications. These results suggest that courts are not
significantly influenced by the gender of the uninformed party when determining the
disclosure duties of bargaining parties.

167

We chose to divide the data set into these time periods for specific reasons, including: that the split
resulted in roughly equal sample sizes of cases involving uninformed females, and that public perceptions
regarding the competence of women involved in commercial and business transactions may have begun to
change around this time.
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To test whether courts’ positions with respect to the level of disclosure required
by the informed party when the uninformed party is female changed over time, we
performed simple counts. Prior to 1950, 24 cases involved an uninformed party who was
female, and 20 cases (or 83%) required disclosure. In contrast, in the period from 1950
to May 15, 2002, 31 cases involved an uninformed party who was female and 13 cases
(or 42%) required disclosure. A test of the equality of proportions indicates that this
difference is statistically significant (p = 0.001). Although, when we control for all other
variables relating to case characteristics, FEMALE does not seem to influence court
decisions, we do find that in cases in which the uninformed party is female courts were
much more likely to require disclosure in cases decided prior to 1950 than in post-1950
cases.
3. Courts are statistically significantly more likely to require disclosure when the
uninformed party was sick, disabled, illiterate, or elderly, though competent to contract,
although the statistical significance of the influence of this variable varies with the
specification of the statistical model.
As discussed in Section II, we hypothesized that courts express sympathy for
uninformed parties who are sick, disabled, illiterate or elderly, though still competent to
contract, by being more likely to rule in their favor because of these factors. The results
presented in Table 4 support this claim. The coefficient on SICK is positive and
significant (p ≤ 0.10) in all specifications. Note, however, that the significance of the
coefficient varies with the specification; in some cases the coefficient is statistically
significant at only the 10% level (e.g., Table 6 indicates a p value of 0.06 when we
control for all case characteristics, case decision year, geographic region and
jurisdiction). Although the evidence is weak for some specifications of the empirical
model, our intuition that when the uninformed party is sympathetic in these particular
ways courts are more likely to require disclosure appears to have been correct.
E. Behavior of the Informed Party
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As discussed in Section II, we hypothesized that courts consider the general
behavior of the informed party when deciding the extent to which secret information
must be disclosed to the uninformed party. Specifically, we predicted that when the
informed party made affirmative misrepresentations or told half-truths in the same
transaction in which the alleged omission occurred and when the informed party actively
concealed information, courts are more likely to find a duty to disclose.
1. Courts are more likely to require disclosure if the court finds that the informed
party made affirmative misrepresentations or told half-truths in the same transaction in
which the alleged omission occurred.
In Section II, we predicted that courts’ decisions regarding whether material
information must be revealed to the uninformed party are influenced by the general
behavior of the informed party. Specifically, if the informed party was found to have
made an affirmative misrepresentation or told a half-truth to the uninformed party in the
same transaction in which the alleged omission occurred, we hypothesized that the court
would be more likely to rule against the informed party in the separate fraudulent silence
claim. The results presented in Table 4 support both of these claims. The coefficients on
LIED and HALF-TRUTH are positive and highly significant (p = 0.00). When we control
for the case decision year and the geographic region and jurisdiction of the court, the
coefficients remain positive and highly significant (p = 0.00). Therefore, the data provide
strong support for the prediction that courts are influenced by the general bad behavior of
the informed party.
2. A court is more likely to find a duty to disclose if it finds that the informed party
actively concealed the withheld information.
As discussed in Section II, we also hypothesized that another form of bad
behavior on the part of the defendant – the active concealment of information – increases
the probability that the court will require disclosure. The results presented in Table 4
support this claim. The coefficient on CONCEAL is positive and highly significant (p =
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0.00). When we control for the case decision year and the geographic region and
jurisdiction of the court, the coefficient remains positive and highly significant (p = 0.00).
Therefore, the data provide strong support for the claim that actions taken by the
informed party to conceal information influence courts’ decisions regarding the
imposition of disclosure duties. When taken together with the findings on LIED and
HALF-TRUTH discussed in Part IV. E.1. supra, the data strongly support the theory that
courts account for the informed party’s behavior in determining whether a duty to
disclose existed.
F. Case Date
Recall from section II that many commentators argue that courts have become
more pro-disclosure during the time period over which our data span. In addition, some
commentators have made more specific claims about changes in the doctrine or
application of the doctrine over time. In this section we investigate these claims about
trends over time and discuss some interesting patterns in the data revealed by our study.
1. Basic regression analyses do not support the claim that courts have become
more likely to require the disclosure of material information over time.
Table 6 presents results from tests of the influences of case decision date on the
likelihood that the court will rule that the informed party had a duty to disclose the
withheld information to the uninformed party.168
The results related to the general trend over time are quite striking. First, while
most commentators claim that courts are more likely to require disclosure in more recent
cases, results generated by logistic regression analysis reported in Table 6 suggest that
courts are less likely to mandate disclosure in recently decided cases. When we control
for all 20 case characteristics and the case decision year, the coefficient on YEAR is
negative and statistically significant (p = 0.01). When we add controls for geographic
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region and jurisdiction of the court, although the coefficient loses some of its
significance, it remains negative and weakly statistically significant (p = 0.08).
Although these results provide support for the claim that courts have become less
likely over time to require the disclosure of material information, testing the claim using
regression analysis does not allow us to determine whether this development progresses
in a linear fashion, or is more complicated, with spikes and valleys during particular time
periods. To investigate this possibility we employed more nuanced statistical tests and
constructed time series graphs.

168

We also analyzed the data using probit analysis and obtained results that were nearly identical to the
results we obtained using logistic regression analysis.
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TABLE 6
MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD LOGIT ESTIMATION RESULTS INCLUDING YEAR, REGION AND JURISDICTION
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PREDICTED LOG ODDS OF COURT FINDING DUTY TO DISCLOSE
COEFFICIENT
VARIABLE

(P VALUE)

Type of Information:
INTRINSIC
PERSONAL
LATENT
INJURE
DAMAGE
UP_CORR

0.16

0.49

- 0.04

0.12

- 0.23

0.13

(0.86)

(0.60)

(0.96)

(0.90)

(0.82)

(0.99)

- 0.32

- 0.22

- 0.30

- 0.18

- 0.35

- 0.29

(0.56)

(0.69)

(0.60)

(0.76)

(0.56)

(0.63)

2.24***

2.09***

2.37***

2.23***

2.34***

2.27***

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

1.05

0.93

1.16

1.28

1.41

1.27

(0.20)

(0.27)

(0.17)

(0.13)

(0.13)

(0.19)

- 0.23

0.03

- 0.27

- 0.16

- 0.29

- 0.14

(0.72)

(0.97)

(0.69)

(0.81)

(0.68)

(0.84)

1.06**

1.12**

1.13**

1.14**

1.26**

1.29**

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

2.65***

2.42***

2.84***

2.50***

2.68***

2.70***

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

- 0.13

- 0.24

- 0.01

- 0.11

- 0.21

- 0.23

(0.84)

(0.71)

(0.99)

(0.86)

(0.76)

(0.75)

Type of Transaction:
CONFID
INSURE
RELEASE
ACCESS
PROPERTY

0.51

0.47

0.51

0.38

0.36

0.35

(0.55)

(0.57)

(0.58)

(0.65)

(0.68)

(0.70)

1.03***

1.05***

1.03***

1.11***

1.24***

1.20***

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.29

0.26

0.33

0.12

- 0.13

- 0.04

(0.45)

(0.50)

(0.40)

(0.77)

(0.76)

(0.92)

Type of Acquisition:
CASUAL
ILLEGAL

0.76*

0.72*

0.81*

0.67*

0.53

0.52

(0.06)

(0.07)

(0.05)

(0.09)

(0.21)

(0.23)

1.26

0.99

0.75

1.26

0.84

0.16

(0.46)

(0.55)

(0.66)

(0.44)

(0.66)

(0.93)

1.18***

1.25***

1.33***

1.20***

1.53***

1.72***

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.04

0.03

0.20

- 0.04

- 0.02

0.17

Uninformed Party Characteristics:
BUYER
FEMALE

(0.93)

(0.94)

(0.67)

(0.93)

(0.97)

(0.74)

1.58**

1.42*

1.66**

1.58**

1.72**

1.56*

(0.03)

(0.05)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.06)

3.17***

3.17***

3.22***

3.23***

3.49***

3.52***

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

CONCEAL

3.15***

3.32***

3.31***

3.27***

3.44***

3.65***

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

HALF_TRUTH

2.81***

2.69***

2.87***

2.73***

2.91***

2.88***

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

SICK
Informed Party Characteristics:
LIED

YEAR

- 0.01**

- 0.01*

(0.01)

(0.08)

Geographic Region:
WEST
SOUTH

0.68

0.45

(0.17)

(0.42)

0.19

0.20

(0.67)

(0.69)

MIDATLANTIC

1.13**

0.97*

(0.01)

(0.07)

SOUTHWEST

1.35**

1.22*

(0.03)

(0.07)

NEW ENGLAND

0.67

0.58

(0.26)

(0.37)

Jurisdiction:
STATE

0.75**

- 1.39

(0.04)

(0.28)
- 1.20

3RD CIRCUIT

- 2.86*

(0.26)

(0.08)

6TH CIRCUIT

- 3.20**

- 4.70**

(0.02)

(0.02)

7TH CIRCUIT

- 2.90**

- 3.74**

(0.02)

(0.05)

Controls for all circuits included †
13.55*

-5.03***

-4.84***

YES

YES

-3.86***

11.09

Constant

-4.41***
(0.00)

(0.06)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.19)

LR Χ2

310.58

317.23

321.20

314.91

325.54

337.22

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

Pseudo R2

0.48

0.49

0.50

0.49

0.52

0.53

N

463

463

463

463

456

456

TABLE 6: This table provides the maximum-likelihood logit estimation results for the effects of case characteristics, including
the decision date, geographic location of the court (Midwest used as base) and jurisdiction of the court, on whether the
court found a duty to disclose.
Note: LR Χ2 indicates the result from testing the null hypothesis that all coefficients in the model, except the constant, equal
zero. In addition, it should be noted that, although pseudo R2 statistics provide a quick way to compare the fit of different
models for the same dependent variable, they lack the straightforward explained-variance interpretation of true R2 in OLS
regression.
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
Only those circuits for which results are statistically significant appear in the table.

†
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2. Analyses using simple tabulations do not support the claim that courts have
been more likely to require disclosure in cases decided in later years.
We employed simple tabulations, the results of which are reported in Table 7, to
check for differences between particular time periods using the entire sample.

TABLE 7
TABULATIONS FOR CASES OVER VARIOUS
PERIODS

PERIOD

COURT
FOUND DUTY
TO DISCLOSE

COURT FOUND
NO DUTY TO
DISCLOSE

1793-1860
1861-1940
1941-2002

10 (67%)
89 (71%)
138 (42%)

5 (33%)
37 (29%)
187 (58%)

TABLE 7: This table presents the results of
tabulations of the number of cases by outcome for
three periods: 1793-1860, 1861-1940 and 1941-2002.

We found that, prior to 1860, courts found a duty to disclose in 67% of cases (or
10 of 15). Between 1861 and 1940, the years roughly between the Civil War and the start
of World War II, courts found a duty to disclose in 71% of cases (or 89 of 126). Finally,
in 42% of cases (or 138 of 325) decided between 1941 and 2002, the court ruled that the
informed party had a duty to disclose. A test for the equality of proportions calculated
for the first two periods indicates that no statistically significant difference exists between
the proportions (p = 0.62). On the other hand, the difference between the proportions
calculated for the period 1861-1940 and 1941-2002 is statistically significant (p = 0.00).
These results do not support claims about an increase in the likelihood that courts will
require disclosure due to the shift from an agrarian to a commercial economy. In fact, the
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data indicates the opposite – courts have been less likely to require the disclosure of
material information from World War II to the present than they were during the period
from the Civil Car until World War II.
3. A time series graph of the dependent variable does not support the claim that
courts have been more likely over time to require informed parties to disclose
information to uninformed parties, but the graphs reveal an interesting pattern when
compared to a time series graph of the number of fraudulent silence decisions across
time.
To get a better sense of the pattern of court decisions over time, we graphed the
proportion of fraudulent silence cases in which the court found that the informed party
owed the uninformed party a duty to disclose (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Proportion of Cases in Which the Court Found a Duty to Disclose
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The graph clearly reveals that the probability of the court imposing a disclosure
duty on the informed party decreases almost linearly over time, especially in the years
after 1970—the years in which most of the cases in our data set were decided. This
observation further supports the findings obtained from the regression analyses. The
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likelihood of the existence of a non-linear relationship between time and the probability
of the court requiring disclosure seems remote given the pattern in the dependent variable
over time revealed in Figure 1.
It is also interesting to note that the number of decisions involving the issue of
whether the informed party owed a duty of disclosure significantly increased over time,
again especially in the years after 1970. Figure 2 presents a graph of the number of
fraudulent silence decisions by five-year periods.169 There are a small number of
decisions during the five-year periods prior to 1900; therefore, we focus mainly on two
trends in the data relating to the 20th Century.

Figure 2: Number of Fraudulent Silence Decisions by Outcome
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Note: Recall that our data set includes cases decided through May 15, 2002. The striped bars represent projections for
the period May 15, 2002 though 2005. The vertical line separates cases decided prior to 1944, all of which are included
in our data set, from cases decided during or after 1944, a random sample of which is included in our data set.
169

Recall that for the years prior to 1944, all relevant cases were included in the data set; whereas, for 1944
and subsequent years, a random sample of the cases was included in the data set. The vertical line drawn in
Figure 2 divides these periods. For this reason, the increase in the number of decided cases is actually
understated in the Figure.
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By examining Figures 1 and 2 simultaneously, we find that, especially in the
years subsequent to 1970, the courts become less likely to require disclosure, while,
during the same period, a significantly increasing number of decisions appear in our
dataset. On its face, this result seems counter-intuitive. One might predict that, as the
probability of winning at trial decreases, fewer uninformed parties will bring claims and
more will settle prior to resolution by the court.170
To explain this seemingly odd result, one would need information on filing
behavior, settlement rates, whether statutes impact the types of cases decided under
common law, whether the issues on which judges choose to write opinions change over
time, and how disclosure rules affect individual decisions about whether to disclose
information. Accordingly, any conjectures made here about what is driving these patterns
are simply that -- conjectures.
Nonetheless, one possibility is worth mentioning. Recall that the existence of a
duty to disclose is only one element of a fraudulent silence case in which the plaintiff
must prove other elements, such as scienter, reliance, and materiality, in order to prevail.
If the increase in the number of fraudulent silence decisions actually reflects an increase
in the number of such claims that are brought and survive to litigation at the same time
that the plaintiff’s probability of winning on the duty to disclose element is decreasing,171
then this could possibly reflect the fact that the plaintiff’s probability of winning on one
or more of the other elements of a fraudulent silence case (materiality, for example) is
170

We recognize the possibility that fewer cases are being filed and more cases make it to the decision
stage as time goes on. Our data, however, do not allow us to investigate the relationship between the
probability of the court imposing a duty to disclose on the informed party and the number of cases decided
per year.
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increasing at an even faster rate. Naturally, we are unable to test this conjecture using our
data. However, our study raises the possibility that a similar study focused on one or
more of the other elements of a fraudulent silence case would reveal interesting time
trends as well.
4. The time trend on the number of fraudulent silence decisions is in marked
contrast to time trends on the number of decisions in contract cases generally.
In a 2001 study of contract litigation, Marc Galanter found that the volume of
trials in contract cases increased until 1990, followed by a substantial decline by about
one-third, culminating in a period of little change from year to year.172 Our data on
fraudulent silence decisions follow a markedly different pattern. Rather than decreasing
during the period after 1990, Figure 2 indicates that fraudulent silence decisions, although
fluctuating somewhat, generally increased after 1990.
Of course, several variables affect the number of decisions in contract cases,
including decisions by informed parties regarding whether to disclose information during
the contracting process, filing behavior, settlement behavior, and statutory developments.
Because we lack information relating to those factors, we do not theorize about why
fraudulent silence decisions do not follow general trends of contract cases. Once again,
however, these findings point to areas of potential research for those interested in patterns
in contract and tort litigation.
5. The data do not support specific claims made by commentators about trends
over time.
Some commentators have made more specific claims about trends over time
relating to the probability that courts will require the disclosure of material information.

171

As noted, an increase in the number of fraudulent silence decisions need not reflect an increase in the
number of fraudulent silence filings.
172
Marc Galanter, Contract in Court; or Almost Everything You May or May Not Want to Know About
Contract Litigation, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. 577 (2001) (reporting, for example, that 2,507 contract trials were
held in federal district court in 1988 while 1,517 trials were held in 1992, 1,081 in 1996 and 902 in 1999).
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For example, recall from Section II that Horwitz claims that, as the United States
transitioned from an agrarian to a commercial economy, courts became more likely to
require the disclosure of information not available to both parties.173 To test this claim,
we ran a logistic regression controlling for the 20 case characteristics, the year the case
was decided, and an interaction term (ACCESS * YEAR), to pick up the trend over time
in cases involving unequal access. The coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant
(p = 0.72), indicating no significant trend over time exists. Our data thus does not support
the Horwitz claim regarding changes in this area of the law due to changes in the
economy.
In addition, in a paper published in 1984, Kronman claimed that disclosure duties
relating to latent defects increased dramatically during the 25-year period between
approximately 1958 and 1983.174 To test this claim, we attempted to employ a logistic
regression using the 20 variables related to case characteristics. This regression, however,
failed because many of the variables are perfect predictors of disclosure and several of
the variables are collinear. Therefore, we employed simple tabulations to test the claim.
We found that, prior to 1958, courts found a duty to disclose in 15 of the 16 cases (or
94%) involving latent defects. In the 25-year period between 1958 and 1983, 12 cases
involved latent defects and, of those 12 cases, the court found a duty to disclose in 11 (or
92%). A test for the equality of proportions finds no statistically significant difference
between the percentages (p = 0.58). Therefore, our data do not support Kronman’s claim
about the development of the law relating to latent defects.
G. Court
1. Courts located in the mid-atlantic states and the southwest are more likely to
require disclosure than are courts located in other geographic regions. In addition, in
contrast to the statements of some commentators, courts located in the south are not
more likely to require disclosure, either during the period over which our data span or
173
174

See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
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historically.
We coded the cases for the geographic region in which the court sits to determine
whether any geographic patterns emerged with respect to case outcomes.175 The basic
regression results presented in Table 6 indicate that courts located in the south, west, and
northeast are no more likely to impose liability for fraudulent silence than are courts
located in other regions.176 The results, however, do indicate that courts located in the
mid-atlantic states and the southwest are more likely to require disclosure than are courts
located in other regions.
As discussed in Section II, some commentators have claimed that southern states
historically were much less likely to impose disclosure duties on bargaining parties than
were states in other regions. To test this claim, we employed two strategies. First, we ran
a logistic regression controlling for the 20 case characteristics, the year the case was
decided, and geographic regions (represented by SOUTH, WEST, MIDATLANTIC,
SOUTHWEST, and NEWENGLAND with MIDWEST as the base) to test for regional
differences over particular periods. The first regression, using data only from cases
decided between 1793 and 1860, failed because several independent variables were
perfect predictors of the likelihood that the court would mandate disclosure. The second
regression used data only from cases decided between 1861 and 1940. The coefficient on
the variable SOUTH is insignificant (p = 0.94), indicating no significant difference
between cases decided in the south and other regions during this period of time.177
Our second strategy involved calculating the proportion of cases in each region
that imposed liability for two early periods: 1793-1860 and 1860-1940. We also
175

States were assigned to geographic regions using the classification employed by the U.S. Embassy. The
classification is available at http://www.usembassy.de/usa/travel-regions.htm.
176
We used the variable MIDWEST as the base to run the regressions. When we include MIDWEST in the
model and use another region as the base, we find that the coefficient on MIDWEST is not significantly
different from zero. Therefore, courts in the midwest are not more or less likely to impose liability for
fraudulent silence than courts in other regions.
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performed similar calculations for the period 1941-2002 for purposes of comparison. The
tabulations by outcome and by region for these three periods are presented in Table 8.
For the period 1793-1860, only 15 cases are contained in the total sample, and
only four of those were decided in the south. In three of the four cases, disclosure was
required. This proportion is equivalent to the proportion of cases decided in the midatlantic states in which the court required disclosure. All other regions require disclosure
in a smaller percentage of cases. While the number of observations is very small,
certainly the claim that the south was less likely to require disclosure is not supported by
the data for this period.
For the periods 1861-1940 and 1941-2002, tests for the equality of proportions
were performed to compare the proportion of cases requiring disclosure and decided in
the south to the proportion of cases requiring disclosure and decided in each of the other
regions. Five separate tests (one for each region) were performed for each period.178 For
each test, the hypothesis of equal proportions was tested against an alternative hypothesis
that the proportion of cases requiring disclosure and decided in the south is significantly
less than the proportion of cases requiring disclosure and decided in the region of
comparison.

177

For the sake of completeness, we ran the same regression using only cases decided between 1941 and
2002. Again, the coefficient on SOUTH was not statistically significant (p = 0.92).
178
In other words, five tests were performed comparing the south with each of the southwest, the west, the
mid-atlantic states, New England, and the Midwest.
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TABLE 8
TABULATIONS FOR DECISIONS BY OUTCOME AND BY REGION
1793-1860

Disclosure Duty Found
Disclosure Duty Not Found

SOUTH

WEST

MIDATLANTIC

SOUTHWEST

NEW ENGLAND

MIDWEST

3 (75%)
1 (25%)

0
0

6 (75%)
2 (25%)

0
0

0 (0%)
1 (100%)

1 (50%)
1 (50%)

1861-1940

Disclosure Duty Found
Disclosure Duty Not Found

SOUTH

WEST

MIDATLANTIC

SOUTHWEST

NEW ENGLAND

MIDWEST

19 (61%)
12 (39%)

4 (40%)
6 (60%)

29 (91%)***
3 (9%)

4 (67%)
2 (33%)

5 (56%)
4 (44%)

28 (74%)
10 (26%)

1941-2002

Disclosure Duty Found
Disclosure Duty Not Found

SOUTH

WEST

MIDATLANTIC

SOUTHWEST

NEW ENGLAND

MIDWEST

33 (41%)
48 (59%)

34 (61%)**
22 (39%)

23 (35%)
43 (65%)

14 (47%)
16 (53%)

10 (46%)
12 (54%)

24 (34%)
46 (66%)

TABLE 8: This table presents the results of tabulations of the number of decisions by outcome and by region for three periods: 1793-1860, 18611940 and 1941-2002. Two-sample, one-sized tests for the equality of proportions were performed to compare the proportion of decisions finding
a duty to disclose and decided in the south to the proportion of decisions finding a duty to disclose and decided in another region. For each test,
the null hypothesis of equal proportions was tested against the alternative hypothesis that the proportion of decisions finding a disclosure duty
and decided in the south is significantly less than the proportion of decisions finding a disclosure duty and decided another region.
* Significantly lower proportion of cases decided in the south as compared to this region, at the 10% signficance level (p < 0.10).
** Significantly lower proportion of cases decided in the south as compared to this region, at the 5% signficance level (p < 0.05).
*** Significantly lower proportion of cases decided in the south as compared to this region, at the 1% signficance level (p < 0.01).

Only two of the ten tests indicate that the south is significantly less likely to
require disclosure as compared to other geographic regions. First, during the period 18611940 courts in the south were less likely to require disclosure than were courts in the midatlantic states. Second, during the period 1941-2002, courts in the south were less likely
to require disclosure than were courts in the west. Otherwise, no statistically significant
difference exists between the proportion of cases decided in the south and finding a duty
to disclose and the proportion of similarly decided cases in courts located in other
regions. Therefore, the data do not provide strong support for the claim that southern
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states historically were less likely to require disclosure as compared to other regions of
the country.
2. State courts are no more or less likely than federal courts to require the
informed party to reveal information to the uninformed party. In addition, the 3rd Circuit,
6th Circuit, and 7th Circuit are more likely than any other circuit to require disclosure.
As indicated in Section II, we were interested in determining whether courts differ
by jurisdiction in terms of how likely they are to require disclosure. Specifically, we were
interested in whether any differences existed between federal and state courts, or among
the federal appellate circuits.
The results presented in Table 6 indicate that the coefficient on STATE is
significant and positive (p = 0.04) when we control only for variables relating to the 20
case characteristics. When we add controls for the case decision year, geographic regions,
and federal appellate circuit, however, the coefficient loses significance. When all
independent variables are included in the model the coefficient on STATE is insignificant
(p = 0.28), indicating that state courts are no more or less likely to require disclosure than
are federal courts.
In addition, the results obtained from the regression analysis (see Table 6)
indicate that three federal appellate jurisdictions are less likely to require disclosure than
any other federal appellate jurisdiction: the 3rd Circuit (p = 0.08), the 6th Circuit (p =
0.02), and the 7th Circuit (p = 0.05).
H. A Note on Priest-Klein
Courts found a duty to disclose in approximately 51% of the cases in the sample. This
statistic is consistent with the Priest-Klein litigation model, which implies that, because
only close cases are likely to proceed to litigation (with clear cases being settled or never
brought at all), “the formal structure of the law [will] appear indeterminate to any
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scientific, empirical method of observing judicial decisions.”179 In other words, the
model suggests that it is impossible to identify factors that significantly influence
outcomes given that all litigated cases are perched on the knife-edge. In roughly half of
the cases, they theorize, the outcome randomly falls to one side of the knife; in the other
half, it randomly falls to the other side.
For this reason, under the Priest-Klein model, our analysis is futile: if the model is
truly predictive, then our analysis should fail to discover any significant drivers of
outcomes. As the following Section reveals, however, nearly half of our independent
variables significantly influence court decisions regarding whether the informed party
had a duty to disclose information to the uninformed party.180 Therefore, we are left to
explain these seemingly contradictory results (i.e., the finding of statistically significant
factors that seem to drive outcomes (contrary to the Priest-Klein predictions) despite the
fact that the outcomes are nearly evenly divided (consistent with the Priest-Klein
predictions)).
One could claim that our results are simply spurious. Given the pattern of our results,
however, we do not believe this is the case. For example, the factors found to
significantly influence outcomes do not appear to be random. Instead, we find that many
of the factors that significantly increase the probability that a court will impose a duty to
disclose are also the most widely-accepted , such as the factors listed in the Restatements
(i.e., whether the parties are in a fiduciary or confidential relationship, whether the
information is related to a latent defect and whether the information would have updated
or corrected previously disclosed information).181

179

See Priest & Klein, supra note 111.
See infra Section VI (describing results from the statistical analysis).
181
See Restatement of Contracts (2d) §161.
180
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In addition, as a matter of theory, there are reasons to doubt that the Priest-Klein
model holds when studying outcomes on the element of the duty to disclose in fraudulent
silence claims. In a fraudulent silence case, the imposition of a duty to disclose is only
one element of a multi-element cause of action in which the plaintiff must also prove
elements such as scienter, reliance, and materiality. As a result, even when the plaintiff
can easily show that the defendant had a duty to disclose, the case nonetheless might
proceed to the litigation and opinion stage due to the parties’ uncertainty about another
element. As a result, cases in which the element of duty is on the knife-edge are but a
subset of the cases in our sample; and, therefore, our regression analysis is able to
identify factors that significantly influence outcomes on the duty element.
Given that our analysis focuses on just one element -- duty -- of a multi-element
cause of action -- fraudulent silence -- one might question why we don’t observe a larger
majority of outcomes on the duty element favoring the plaintiff.182 It must be
remembered, however, that plaintiffs may sometimes raise claims that they have a small
probability of winning. This is true, for example, of suits in which plaintiffs have one or
more relatively strong claims, but can allege other, weaker, claims based on the same fact
pattern. Under such circumstances, the marginal cost of adding an additional weak claim
to the suit is essentially zero.183 Under these circumstances, the plaintiffs’ success rate on
the duty element could be less than 50%. For these reasons, that fact that we observe 50%
of the outcomes on the duty element favoring the plaintiff might very well be anomalous
and unrelated to the predictions of the Priest/Klein model.184
182

One could argue that, if the duty element is not an element that is balanced on the knife-edge, then it
must be an element on which the plaintiff is more likely to win. Otherwise, one might speculate that
rational plaintiffs would not bring the case.
183
For example, consider cases in which the plaintiff’s strongest claim is that the defendant affirmatively
misrepresented a material fact. In cases such as these, the plaintiff might find that the marginal cost of
adding even a weak claim to the suit alleging affirmative misrepresentation is essentially zero. In other
words, if the facts giving rise to an affirmative misrepresentation claim also give rise to an albeit weak
fraudulent silence claim, then the plaintiff might tack on the weak fraudulent silence claim.
184
See Shavell (demonstrating that any distribution of outcomes is supportable). [finish cite]
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V.

CONCLUSION

The question of when an individual in possession of valuable information unknown to
her contracting partner has the right to remain silent and profit from her secret knowledge
has fascinated scholars in philosophy, law, and history since ancient times. Many have
developed specific and general theories (what we term “meta-theories”) to explain the
variation in case outcomes. Few, however, have attempted to systematically analyze the
cases and none has employed regression analysis to isolate the effect of particular factors
on case outcomes.
Our analysis casts doubt on much of the conventional wisdom regarding the law of
fraudulent silence. In fact, our results challenge ten of the most prominent theories that
have been asserted to explain when courts will require full disclosure between contracting
parties. Specifically, our data do not support the contentions that courts more frequently
require the disclosure of intrinsic information than extrinsic information; that courts insist
on the disclosure of information that could prevent bodily injury or property damage; that
informed parties are able to freely withhold information regarding personal intentions or
opinions; that those seeking insurance, surety, or a release from liability must disclose all
relevant information; that courts more frequently require disclosure in transactions
relating to the sale or transfer of real property; that courts tend not to require the
disclosure of deliberately acquired information; that courts have become more likely to
require disclosure over time; or that southern states are less likely to require disclosure
than are states in other regions of the country.
However, in some cases, at least, it appears that the conventional wisdom is correct.
Our data support the hypotheses that courts are more likely to require the disclosure of
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latent, as opposed to patent, defects; that courts are more likely to require the disclosure
of information that would update or correct previously disclosed information, that courts
are more likely to require full disclosure between parties in a fiduciary or confidential
relationship; that courts are more likely to require the disclosure of illegally or tortiously
acquired information; and that courts are more likely to require disclosure when the
uninformed party is a buyer or lessee.
In addition, our own intuition that courts are swayed by the sympathetic nature of the
uninformed party and the bad behavior of the informed party are supported by the data.
Courts are significantly more likely to require disclosure when the uninformed party is
sick, disabled, illiterate, or elderly, though still competent to contract. Also, courts are
more likely to require disclosure when the informed party lied or told half-truths in the
same transaction in which the omission occurred, or when the informed party took
affirmative steps to conceal the withheld information. However, our suspicion that courts
are more likely to require disclosure when the uninformed party is female is not
supported by the data, although our data did reveal a time trend in fraudulent silence
decisions when the uninformed party is female. The percentage of cases in which the
uninformed party is female and the court required disclosure decreased significantly from
the period 1793-1950 to the period 1951-2002.
Perhaps most importantly, our analysis suggests that the long-standing and heated
debate between those who argue that courts attempt primarily to enhance fairness by
placing contracting parties on a more even playing field and those who argue that courts
primarily attempt to enhance economic efficiency by allowing informed parties to reap
the benefit of knowledge that is deliberately acquired is largely misplaced. Our data
provide little, if any, support for the contention that courts are more likely to require the
disclosure of casually, as compared to deliberately, acquired information. Regression
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results do indicate that courts are more likely to require the disclosure of information
when the parties lack equal access. Our analysis, however, reveals that it is the presence
of unequal access in combination with casually acquired information that drives case
outcomes. Therefore, it is the existence of these two factors together, rather than either
one alone, that is a significant predictor of case outcomes.
In the end, however, we view this study merely as a first step toward unraveling a
difficult and controversial area of law, rather than a definitive answer to the question of
what drives outcomes in fraudulent silence cases. Although this study provides some
answers, it raises many questions as well.
For example, although our data show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, courts
have become less likely over time to require the disclosure of material information
unknown to one’s bargaining partner, does this mean that courts have become more prodefendant over time? Or have other factors, such as the codification of certain areas of
fraudulent silence law through statutes that mandate particular disclosures, altered the
type of case that survives to litigation under the common law?185
In addition, regression analyses on data spanning a two hundred year period do not
permit us to capture the law at any particular point in time. However, alternative
strategies (such as, for example, using regression analysis over moving windows of
smaller time periods) allow such an analysis. Not only would this strategy more fully
highlight any time trends in the data, but also it would permit testing for whether
particular events or developments of note, such as, for example, the publication of the
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Common examples are statutes mandating certain disclosures in residential real estate transactions and
car sales. Because such statutes are generally pro-plaintiff, if these statutes merely codify changes that
were already occurring under the common law, then the cases remaining to be decided under the common
law could conceivably be those in areas of the law in which courts were not expanding disclosure duties.
As a result, these cases would appear to reflect a pro-defendant trend that does not really exist.
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Second Restatement of Contracts, actually produced changes in the law (as has been
asserted by some commentators186), rather than simply restated the law.
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